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Charles A. Pulaski, Jr.***
Recent rhetoric in the Supreme Court and Congress has given currency and
legitimacy to claims that racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty is inevitable and impossible to prevent, detect, and correct. This Article
considers the plausibility of these claims, which can be viewed more profitably as
testable hypotheses. We argue that the inevitability hypothesis isprobably overstated
and that the impossibility hypothesis is almost certainly wrong. With proper
procedures and firm enforcement ofproscriptions against racial discrimination, we
argue, capital sentencing systems can be largely purged of the discrimination that
currently exists. We also consider recent developments in the New Jersey and
Florida Supreme Courts that provide modelsfor examining structural discrimination
in capital sentencing and discrimination in individual cases. Over time, develop-
ments in these and in other state courts may shed important light on the plausibility
of the inevitability and impossibility hypotheses.
One source of resistance to the adaptation of legal initiatives to curb racial
discrimination in capital sentencing has been uncertainty about how best to use
statistical evidence as a basis for detecting purposeful discrimination. This Article
focuses on various presumption-based models for evaluating statistical evidence of
discrimination in individual cases. One is a "risk-based" model ofproofpatterned
after Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in McCleskey, v. Kemp; it would entitle
a defendant to relief if he demonstrated systemic, purposeful discrimination in a
death sentencing system that implicated his case. A more conservative "but-for"
causation model ofproof, used in employment cases and other contexts outside the
criminal law, would permit the State to prevail despite statistical evidence of
systemic, purposeful discrimination. The death sentence in an individual claimant's
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case could be carried out if the State could prove by a preponderance of objective
evidence that race was not a but-forfactor in the defendant's case-that is, if it could
demonstrate with evidence from other similar cases that because of the aggravated
nature of the defendant's case, he would have received a death sentence irrespective
of his race (or the race of his victim). A less conservative causation-based model of
proof would allow the State to prevail if it could demonstrate that race was not a
"substantial factor" in the individual's case. Under a third model, the State could
prevail with proof that race was not a "motivating factor" in the individual's case.t
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RACE DISCRIMINATION IN DEATH SENTENCING
L Introduction
Discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity has deep roots in
American culture.' However, over the past forty years, changing percep-
tions of the legitimacy of such discrimination have produced a civil rights
revolution. This revolution began with civil disobedience and political
unrest, but ultimately manifested itself in a series of judicial decisions and
legislative enactments directed toward the elimination of discrimination from
most major governmental institutions-voting, employment, housing, public
education, and the delivery of other public services. One institution that lags
behind in this regard, however, is the criminal justice system, particularly
as it applies to capital punishment.
The criminal justice system's failure to adapt may seem surprising
because during this same period, concerns about racial discrimination in the
use of the death penalty, especially in the South, prompted the United States
Supreme Court to expand the procedural rights of all criminal defendants.
Concerns about racial discrimination were also an unstated motivation for
the Supreme Court's abolition of the death penalty in nonfatal rape cases in
the 1970s.2 However, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has been
willing to take direct action to prevent racial factors from influencing which
defendants are sentenced to death for capital crimes.
Until recently, one obstacle to judicial action was the claim that the
existence of racial discrimination had not been adequately proven. In
Furman v. Georgia,3 this "not proven" objection appeared in both concur-
ring and dissenting opinions4 in response to Justice Marshall's flat assertion
that the system was racist to the core.' This objection also served as an
invitation to interested social scientists, statisticians, and lawyers to test
empirically the claim that discrimination did not exist in the administration
of the death penalty. The resulting research from the past fifteen years has
produced a significant body of evidence that suggested that in many states,
1. See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 1.14 (3d ed. 1992).
2. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that death penalty for
rape violates Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); id.
at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 389 n. 12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 449 (Powell,
., dissenting).
5. Id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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on average, the killer of a white victim was more likely to receive a death
sentence than a similarly situated killer of a minority victim.6
Despite this evidence, neither the Court nor Congress has acted as they
did on prior occasions-sometimes on the basis of less compelling evidence
of discrimination in other areas of American life-by establishing rules and
procedures to prevent discrimination and to remedy the effects of pre-
existing discrimination. Instead, the Court and Congress have found new
obstacles to effective action, which take the form of three assertions:
1. Racial discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is
inevitable and impossible to prevent;
2. Racial discrimination in capital sentencing is impossible to detect;
and
3. Racial discrimination is impossible to correct in individual cases
without abolishing capital punishment altogether or requiring the
overt use of quotas.
These assertions have been advanced to justify closure on the issue of
race and the death penalty and to terminate discussion and exploration of the
issue. Such a result would spare the Court from confronting the difficult
constitutional dilemmas that it might face if it closely examined the
American death penalty system.7 For the states, judicial recognition of the
legitimacy of claims of racial discrimination in individual capital cases could
mean additional costs, complexity, and delay.8 Moreover, the evidence that
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIEs 5 (1990) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
7. The alternatives available to remedy the problem of racial discrimination in capital
punishment might include such politically difficult options as (a) narrowing the class of death-
eligible cases, (b) requiring standards to limit the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, (c)
recognizing claims of racial discrimination in individual cases and evaluating those claims
under burdens of proof comparable to those applied in other areas of the law, or (d)
abolishing the death penalty.
8. Ronald Tabak has noted that the eradication of racial discrimination from a state's
death sentencing system could, by reducing the number of questionable death sentences, result
in savings of money and time. Indeed, if a state were to follow the suggestion of Justices
Blackmun and Stevens in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), and limit death
sentencing only to the most aggravated categories of cases in which there was no evidence
of racial discrimination, there would be substantially fewer capital prosecutions, which would
result in great cost savings. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 367 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Also, with a smaller volume, the remaining highly aggravated cases could
be adjudicated more rapidly.
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emerged in the adjudication of such claims might reduce the legitimacy of
capital punishment. Thus, acceptance of claims of impossibility and
inevitability avoids the necessity to confront a variety of unpalatable issues.
Acceptance of these claims also avoids responsibility for the existing state
of affairs and justifies the status quo. 9
In contrast to some other legal propositions, the impossibility and
inevitability assertions represent testable hypotheses.' The first hypothe-
sis-"inevitability"-is that racial discrimination in the United States is
inherent in its death sentencing systems and that no combination of rules and
standards can prevent it. The second hypothesis-"impossibility"-is that
discrimination is impossible to detect and impossible to correct in individual
cases without the de facto abolition of capital punishment or the use of race-
based quotas to limit the exercise of the discretion of prosecutors and juries.
In this Article, we explore the role that claims of inevitability and
impossibility have played in the recent capital punishment debate in the
Supreme Court and Congress. We also evaluate their inherent plausibility
and their plausibility in the face of the available data. In this latter regard,
we report recent developments in the New Jersey and Florida Supreme
Courts, which have developed models of proof to assess claims of structural
discrimination and of discrimination in individual cases." We also
consider alternative models of proof that might be employed to evaluate
claims of discrimination in individual cases. The first is a risk-based model,
patterned after Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in McCleskey v.
9. For an insightful discussion of the rhetoric of judicial opinions in general, see
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv. 1545,
1560-66 (1990). Ronald Tabak has pointed out that it may not be fair to say that the Supreme
Court has done as much as Congress to advance the view that no one should deal with these
issues. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which rejected constitutional claims of
racial discrimination in death sentencing, can be interpreted as saying that courts should not,
by purporting to apply the Constitution, consider such issues on their own initiative. Rather,
legislative bodies should address the problem and thereby eventually compel the courts to do
so as well.
10. For example, the assertion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), that a fetus is
not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment is not susceptible to empirical verification.
See id. at 158.
11. See Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455,465-68 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 398 (1993); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d
1059, 1070-88 (N.J. 1992).
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Kemp 2 and a recent dissenting opinion in the Florida Supreme Court.3
Such a model would entitle a capital defendant to relief upon proof of
systemic, purposeful discrimination in the death sentencing system that
implicates his case. We also consider three more conservative, causation-
based models that are patterned after approaches used in employment
discrimination law and in other contexts outside the criminal law. These
models would entitle the State to prevail, despite evidence of systemic,
purposeful discrimination that implicates a defendant's case, if the State
could establish with objective evidence that in the defendant's case, race was
not (a) a "but-for factor," (b) a "substantial factor," or (c) a "motivating
factor."
I. McCleskey v. Kemp
McCleskey is important because it represents the Court's first serious
consideration of empirical evidence of discrimination in the post-Furman era
of death sentencing. The Scottish verdict of "not proven" tacitly used by the
Court in Furman could not plausibly provide a ground for rejecting
McCleskey's claims because the petitioner's evidence comprised one of the
most exhaustive bodies of social scientific data and analysis ever assembled
to examine a criminal law issue. Instead, the McCleskey opinion developed
the theses of inevitability and impossibility, which figured significantly in the
ensuing congressional debate over the desirability and feasibility of
bypassing McCleskey through legislation that would allow condemned
prisoners to raise claims of racial discrimination under the authority of
federal law. 4
Warren McCleskey was an African-American who killed a white
police officer during an armed robbery in Fulton County, Georgia.'" The
jury found two aggravating circumstances present in his case-the victim
was a police officer and the homicide occurred in the course of an armed
robbery-and returned a death sentence. 6 In postconviction proceedings,
McCleskey made two claims. First, he presented a structural challenge to
12. 481 U.S. 279, 351-53 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13. Foster, 614 So. 2d at 467-68 (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
14. See infra notes 76-127 and accompanying text (discussing congressional reform
efforts in wake of McCleskey).
15. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
16. Id. at 284-85.
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the constitutionality of Georgia's capital sentencing system and alleged that
it was administered in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of both
the cruel and unusual punishments provision of the Eighth Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Specifically,
he alleged that black defendants and defendants whose victims wele white
were at a substantially greater risk of receiving a death sentence in Georgia
than white defendants and defendants whose victims were black. 8
McCleskey supported these claims with an analysis of over 2,000 defendants
who had been indicted for murder and convicted of either murder or volun-
tary manslaughter in Georgia between 1973 and 1979.19 His evidence
showed that among the cases involving black defendants, the death
sentencing rate was 21% when the victim was white, but only 1 % when the
victim was black." Among all cases with one or more white victims, the
data showed a death sentencing rate of 11% versus a 1 % rate in the black-
victim cases." These frequently cited figures do not, however, take into
account the possibility that systematic differences in the degree of aggrava-
tion or heinousness might distinguish the average white-victim and black-
,victim case and thereby explain the sharp differential in the death sentencing
rates in the two groups of cases. To address this issue, McCleskey presented
numerous statistical analyses that accounted for differences in the aggrava-
tion level of each case.?
As expected, the "adjusted" race-of-victim disparities were less
dramatic. After statistical adjustment for 39 nonracial statutory and
nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances (such as whether the
murder occurred during a rape or robbery, whether the murderer had a prior
criminal record, or whether more than one victim was killed), on average a
defendant's odds of receiving a death sentence were still 4.3 times higher if
the murder victim were white.' The evidence also suggested that these
17. Id. at 286.
18. Id. at 286-87.
19. Id. at 286.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 287 & n.5.
23. Id. at 287; see DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 316-20 (1990). The analyses presented in McCleskey did not show consistent
statistically significant statewide race-of-defendant effects. Id. at 328.
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race-of-victim effects were principally the product of prosecutorial plea
bargaining decisions and prosecutorial decisions to seek death sentences in
death-eligible cases.' Moreover, McCleskey's evidence showed that
among the moderately aggravated cases-the so-called "mid-range" of
cases-in which the facts neither called out strongly for life (as in a drunken
brawl among acquaintances), nor for death (as in a torture murder or
multiple slaying case), the race-of-victim disparities were much greaterY
Indeed, among black-defendant cases with a level of criminal culpability
comparable to McCleskey, white-victim cases resulted in death sentences in
approximately 34% of the cases, while similar black-victim cases resulted
in death sentences in only 17% of the cases.'
McCleskey's second claim was that his own death sentence was the
product of racial discrimination and that as a consequence, it violated both
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.?7 To support
this claim, he emphasized, as noted above, that statewide his case fell into
the category of cases in which the statistical evidence of discrimination was
strongest.' He also supplemented these data with statistical evidence
specific to Fulton County, where his own case had been prosecuted.29
24. Prosecutors regularly agreed to accept guilty pleas in black-victim cases that
allowed the defendant to accept in return a life sentence or less, but insisted more commonly
that defendants in white-victim cases go to trial for capital murder. See BALDUS ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 327-28.
25. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 n.5; see BALDUS Er AL., supra note 23, at 320-21.
26. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 320-21.
27. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92, 308.
28. Id. at 287 n.5.
29. McCleskey presented data on 581 Fulton County murder cases, which are
summarized in Table 1. These data suggest that substantial race-of-victim effects also existed
in Fulton County in plea bargaining and prosecutorial decisions to seek the death sentence.
BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 337-38. Although the data in Table 1 are not adjusted for
the criminal culpability of the defendants involved, McCleskey presented the results of
multivariate statistical analyses in which the race-of victim disparities persisted after
adjustment for legitimate case characteristics. See id. at 337-39.
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Table 1
Fulton County Race-of-Victim Disparities in the Disposition of Cases at Six
Points in the Charging-and-Sentencing Process and Overall, for All Cases (css),
[ A JB CZEII i E [F
Race of Victim Arithmetic
Average Difference Ratio
Rate White Black (C-D) (CID)
1. Indictment for .92 .95 .91 .04 1.04
murder (581/629) (161/169) (420/460)
2. Guilty plea to vol-
untary manslaugh-
ter after a murder .59 .45 .64 -. 19 .70
indictment (340/581) (72/161) (268/420)
3. Guilty plea to
murder and no .21 .30 .16 .14 1.88
penalty trial (51/241) (27/89) (24/152)
4. Murder convic-
tion at guilt .68 .81 .62 .19 1.31
trial (129/189) (50/62) (79/127)
5. Case advanced to
a penalty trial after
murder conviction
at a guilt trial .17 .24 .13 .11 1.85
6. Death sentence (19/110) (11/46) (8/64)
imposed at penalty





resulting in a .02 .05 .005 .045 10
death sentence (10/581) (8/161) (2/420)
2 BALDUS Er AL. supra note 23. at 338.
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Table 2 shows the effects of race among the 32 most aggravated death-eligible Fulton
County cases, which include McCleskey.
Table 2
Fulton County Unadjusted and Adjusted Race-of-Victim Disparities Among Cases
with the Highest Predicted Likelihood of Receiving a Death Sentence (css)l
A [ B C__ I__D__ E F
Race of Victim Arithmetic
Average Difference Ratio
Rate White Black (C-D) (CID)
I. All cases .31 .47 .13 .34 3.6
(n = 32) (10/32) (8/17) (2/15)
II. By aggravation
level
A. More aggravated .57 .75 .33 .42 2.27
cases (8/14) (6/8) (2/6)
(n = 14)
B. Typical cases .25 .40 .00 .40 Infinite
(n = 8) (2/8) (2/5) (0/3)
C. Less aggravated
cases .00 .00 .00 .00 Infinite
(n = 10) (0/10) (0/4) (0/6)
BALDUS Er AL., supra note 23, at 335. This sample also includes five penalty-trial cases that were not among
the cases with the highest predicted likelihood of receiving a death sentence.
The data in Table 2 indicate that the death sentencing rate in white-victim cases was
47%, compared to 13% in the black-victim cases-a 34-point disparity. BALDUS ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 335. After adjustment for the different levels of criminal culpability, the
race-of-victim disparity in these Fulton County cases, which we estimated for this Article,
was 28 percentage points. In the "typical" category, in which McCleskey's case was located,
the race-of-victim disparity was 40 points (40% compared to 0%), although the sample sizes
were small. See id.
McCleskey's proof also focused on the 16 other Fulton County cases that involved a
police officer victim, the most aggravating characteristic of his case. McCleskey, 481 U.S.
at 356-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 334. Six
involved black victims, and 10 involved white victims. Id. Of these cases, only one other,
with a black victim, advanced to a penalty trial, and it resulted in a life sentence. McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 357 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see BALDUS FT AL., supra note 23, at 334.
McCleskey further established that there were neither guidelines nor a system of supervisory
oversight to regulate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Fulton County. McCleskey,
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McCleskey argued that his evidence of race-of-victim discrimination,
both statewide and in Fulton County, created a presumption that both the
prosecutor and jury had discriminated against him in the decisions that led
to his death sentence.3" Because the State had failed to rebut this presump-
tion, McCleskey argued that he had established a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which entitled him to relief
from his death sentence.31 He also argued that the data established a
sufficiently large risk of racial discrimination in his case to constitute a viola-
tion of the cruel and unusual punishments provision of the Eighth Amend-
ment,32 which had been interpreted in earlier Supreme Court cases to bar
capital sentencing procedures that created an unacceptable risk of sentencing
error.
33
The five-justice majority opinion in McCleskey did not explicitly
address the structural claim that the entire Georgia death sentencing system
was unconstitutional. Rather, it focused on McCleskey's narrower assertion
that his proof entitled him to relief because of discrimination in his particular
case.' Addressing McCleskey's equal protection claim, Justice Powell
held that statistical evidence of systemic racial discrimination, either state-
wide or in a single judicial district, was an insufficient basis for relief in an
individual case unless the defendant could establish by direct evidence that
there had been discrimination by the prosecutor or jury in his case.35 In so
ruling, Justice Powell rejected McCleskey's argument that he could rely in
his case on a presumption of discrimination36 based on his statistical proof
of race-of-victim discrimination statewide and in Fulton County. Addressing
McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim, Justice Powell further held that the
481 U.S. at 357-58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 338,
346. Finally, McCleskey demonstrated that his 12-person jury included only one black juror.
See id. at 340.
30. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93.
31. Id. at 291.
32. Id. at 308.
33. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
34. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 292-93.
369
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demonstrated risk of racial discrimination in McCleskey's case was not suffi-
ciently great to warrant relief.
37
Justice Powell presented four main justifications for the Court's
decision. The first was methodological. Unlike the district court, which had
rejected McCleskey's statistical evidence as unreliable and had implied that
proof of discrimination in a capital sentencing system was impossible, Justice
Powell "assume[d] the study [was] valid statistically without reviewing the
factual findings of the District Court., 38 He declined, however, to apply
the usual presumptions arising from statistical evidence that the Court rou-
tinely relies upon to establish equal protection and Title VII claims in cases
challenging jury selection procedures or discrimination in employment39
and explained that the capital punishment system involved a larger number
of independent decision makers who considered a larger number of
variables.'t The standard set by McCleskey for proving constitutional
violations means that proof of racial discrimination in capital punishment
cases is beyond the capacity of virtually all capital defendants.4'
Second, Justice Powell emphasized the importance of prosecutorial
discretion in the American criminal justice system and expressed concern
about possible unfairness in asking prosecutors to explain their decisions .42
Third, he expressed a fear that relief for McCleskey under the Eighth
Amendment could invite a variety of additional claims of arbitrariness that
might call into question the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.43
Justice Powell's fourth rationale rests on assertions of inevitability aid
impossibility. He first noted that jurors bring to their deliberations different
"qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience. "I He next
37. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 291 n.7.
39. Id. at.293-94.
40. Id. at 294-95.
41. The only models of proof left open by McCleskey are direct evidence of
discrimination (e.g., admissions by prosecutors and jurors that race was an important or but-
for factor in their decisions) and statistical disparities of a magnitude inlikely to be seen in
this country.
42. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296; see id. at 311-12 (discussing entrenchment of
prosecutorial discretion in American law).
43. Id. at 315-18.
44. Id. at 311 (quoting Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (opinion of Marshall,
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observed that the judgments of juries "often [were] difficult to explain" and
that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing [were] an inevitable part of our
criminal justice system."45 Finally, he stated that "McCleskey's wide-rang-
ing arguments ... basically challenge[d] the validity of capital punishment
in our multiracial society," a statement which could be taken to imply that
short of total abolition of the death penalty, elimination of the inevitable
disparities in death sentencing was impossible.' Another interpretation of
his statement, however, is merely that elimination of discrimination is a
difficult task. For if Justice Powell truly believed that discrimination was
impossible to detect and correct, why would he have invited "legislative
bodies" to address the issue?47
Four justices dissented. Each believed that McCleskey's data were
valid and clearly established a pattern of race-of-victim discrimination in
both the State of Georgia and Fulton County.' Each also put to one side
the structural challenge to the constitutionality of Georgia's death sentencing
system as a whole and focused on whether discrimination had been
45. Id. at311-12.
46. Id. Justice Powell's inevitability and impossibility rhetoric may have been
influenced by Justice Scalia, who did not write an opinion in the case. However, three
months before McCleskey was decided, Justice Scalia circulated to the Court a short
memorandum on the subject. Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Justice, United States
Supreme Court, to the Conference of the Justices, United States Supreme Court (Jan. 6,
1987) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). First, he took issue with Justice
Powell's suggestion that McCleskey's sentence would have been different if his statistical
evidence had been stronger: "Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational
sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial
decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot
honestly say that all I need is more proof." Id. at 1. Justice Scalia also took issue with
Justice Powell's methodological justification for discounting McCleskey's statistical evidence:
"I disagree with the argument that the inferences that can be drawn from the Baldus study are
weakened by the fact that each jury and each trial is unique, or by the large number of
variables at issue." Id. Justice Scalia's memo surfaced in Justice Marshall's papers, recently
opened to the public by the Library of Congress.
47. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
48. See id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 356 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.
at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even though Justice Stevens was persuaded that McClesk-
ey's data were valid, he would have, in the interest of "orderly procedure," remanded the
study to the court of appeals to decide whether in fact the data were valid and to determine
whether McCleskey's case fell within the range of cases involving an unacceptable risk that
"race played a decisive role" in the imposition of the death sentence. Id. at 367.
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established in McCleskey's case.49 Justice Brennan's Eighth Amendment
analysis addressed the evidence that McCleskey's case fell within a category
of cases (both statewide and in Fulton County) that involved a substantial
risk that the race of the victim was a factor in the imposition of the death
penalty. Accordingly, he concluded that McCleskey's death sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishment. ",
Justice Blackmun addressed McCleskey's equal protection claim.5
What was required, he said, was not just proof of a "risk" of discrimination,
but proof of "the existence of purposeful discrimination."' To evaluate
McCleskey's evidence, Justice Blackmun developed a three-part risk-based
model of proof patterned on models used in challenges to the prosecutorial
use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky?3 and in claims of
discrimination in the selection of jury venires.5 4 Because he was black and
his victim was white, McCleskey easily satisfied the first prong of the test:
McCleskey was a member of a constitutionally protected class.55 The third
prong-that "the allegedly discriminatory procedure [was] susceptible to
abuse or [was] not racially neutral" 56-was also easily met.'
The showing necessary to satisfy the second prong was more difficult.
It required McCleskey to demonstrate "a substantial likelihood that his death
sentence [was] due to racial factors."58 On the basis of his survey of
McCleskey's statewide and Fulton County data, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the "showing is of sufficient magnitude that, absent evidence to the
contrary, one must conclude that racial factors entered into the decision-
49. See id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 349 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.
at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 351.
53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 353. Without much discussion, the majority recognized a defendant's
standing to raise a claim of discrimination based on the race of his victim. Id. at 291 n.8.
56. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 357-58.
58. Id. at 353.
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making process that yielded McCleskey's death sentence."59 In Justice
Blackmun's view, McCleskey's statistical evidence shifted the burden to the
State to "demonstrate that legitimate racially neutral criteria and procedures
yielded this racially skewed result."' The State, he concluded, had failed
to meet this burden, thereby entitling McCleskey to relief.61 Justice
Blackmun's model of proof did not require a finding that race was a "but-
for," or even a substantial, factor in the decisions of the prosecutor or jury
that resulted in his death sentence. Rather, he focused on the decision-
making process that produced McCleskey's sentence and the probability that
racial factors influenced that process. 2 The obvious implication of Justice
Blackmun's opinion was that a defendant seeking relief had to establish that
his case fell into a category of cases in which racial disparities were clearly
established.'
Justice Blackmun also implicitly rejected an "inevitability" hypothesis
and suggested instead that racial discrimination in the system generally could
be reduced: "ITihe establishment of guidelines for Assistant District
Attorneys as to the appropriate basis for exercising their discretion at the
various steps in the prosecution of a case would provide at least a measure
of consistency."I4 Justice Blackmun also joined Justice Stevens in rejecting
the view, implicit in Justice Powell's majority opinion, that granting relief
in cases like McCleskey "would sound the death knell for capital punishment
in Georgia. "I In the words of Justice Stevens:
If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to [the
most highly aggravated categories of cases in which death sentences
are consistently imposed without regard to race], the danger of
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty would be
significantly decreased, if not eradicated.... [S]uch a restructuring
of the sentencing scheme is surely not too high a price to pay. 6
59. Id. at 359.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 360.
62. See id. at 350-51.
63. See id. at 351-52.
64. Id. at 365.
65. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. Justice Blackmun's recently developed view that America's present death
penalty system is unconstitutional appears to rest in part on a belief in the inevitability of
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IlL The Impact of McCleskey
If the purpose of McCleskey was to provoke closure, it certainly was
successful in the federal courts. The decision has eliminated the federal
courts as a forum for the consideration of statistically based claims of racial
discrimination in capital sentencing.67 We know of only one case since
McCleskey in which a federal district court has granted a hearing on a claim
of racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty, and the claim
was dismissed for failure to meet the McCleskey burden of proof.68
discrimination in the system as it is currently administered. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S.
Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Whether Justice Blackmun believes that
an evenhanded system is impossible to achieve under more tightly regulated procedures is less
clear. There is no doubt, however, that he believes that an evenhanded system is impossible
to achieve under the death penalty law as it is presently administered by the state and federal
courts. See id. On the issue of discrimination, Justice Blackmun noted both the absence of
a "serious effort to impeach" McCleskey's data and the failure of "proponents of capital
punishment [to] provided any reason to believe that the findings of that study are unique to
Georgia." Id. at 1135-36.
67. See, e.g., Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
statistical evidence for lack of proof of purposeful discrimination in application of death
penalty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1600 (1993); Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1490-91
(9th Cir. 1990) (same), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992); Moore v. Zant, 885 F.2d 1497, 1514
n.16 (11th Cir. 1989) (rejecting Baldus study), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990); Smith v.
Dugger, 840 F.2d 787, 796 (1 lth Cir. 1988) (denying evidentiary hearing on several general
statistical studies on ground that even if studies were valid, they would be insufficient to
demonstrate unconstitutional discrimination under Fourteenth Amendment or to show
irrationality, arbitrariness, or capriciousness under Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1047 (1990); Darden v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 287, 295 (1lth Cir. 1987) (rejecting study
of racial discrimination in death sentencing), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943 (1988); Moore v.
Kemp, 824 F.2d 847, 857 (1lth Cir. 1987) (rejecting Baldus study), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1028 (1989); Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1450 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejecting empirical
studies of discrimination in application of death penalty in Florida for lack of proof of
discriminatory purpose), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d
98, 99 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting statistic-based claim of discrimination), aft'd, 487 U.S. 164
(1988); Celestine v. Butler, 823 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir.) (rejecting discrimination claim for
lack of proof of intent to discriminate), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1036 (1987); Williams v.
Chrans, 742 F. Supp. 472, 494 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (rejecting statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion), aft'd, 945 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3002 (1992); Smith v.
Thigpen, 689 F. Supp. 644, 663 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (same), aft'd, 904 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.
1990), vacated sub nora. Smith v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1463 (1992).
68. See Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1572, 1575-79 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding
that qualitative evidence failed to establish that penalty-trial jurors "acted with discriminatory
purpose when they decided to impose the death penalty"), aft'd, 963 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir.
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State courts, by contrast, are not bound by McCleskey and are free to
entertain claims of racial discrimination under their state constitutions. Even
so, state courts routinely invoke McCleskey as a justification for dismissing
such claims with or without a hearing.69 Two state courts, however, have
rejected McCleskey-New Jersey, in the death sentencing context,70 and
Minnesota, in the context of noncapital sentencing." Also, a three-person
minority of the seven-member Florida Supreme Court has rejected it.'
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
69. See, e.g., Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1989) (rejecting evidence
that death penalty is imposed in racially discriminatory manner); McCrae v. State, 510 So.
2d 874, 879 (Fla. 1987) (rejecting appellant's evidence because statistical disparities do not
establish that appellant's sentence was imposed with discriminatory purpose); People v.
Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 49 (III.) (rejecting Gross study), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 917
(1988); People v. Orange, 521 N.E.2d 69, 82 (I11.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900
(1988); People v. Stewart, 520 N.E.2d 348, 355 (I11.) (same); cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987
(1988); People v. Davis, 518 N.E.2d 78, 80-81 (Ii. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1059 (1989); State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527,538-39 (Mo.) (en bane) (rejecting defendant's
statistics demonstrating that Missouri's death penalty violates Equal Protection Clause on
ground that defendant failed to show intention to discriminate), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933
(1987); State v. Dickerson, 543 N.E.2d 1250, 1260 (Ohio 1989) (rejecting appellant's
statistics based on two Lucas County cases), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State v.
Sowell, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1309 (Ohio 1988) (rejecting appellant's equal protection claim on
ground that appellant failed to offer any evidence that improper racial considerations
prompted his sentence), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989); State v. Byrd, 512 N.E.2d 611,
619 (Ohio 1987) (rejecting defendant's evidence that those convicted of murder of whites in
Hamilton County are more frequently sentenced to death on grounds that issue was not raised
at trial and that claim was rejected in McCleskey), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1037 (1988); State
v. Zuern, 512 N.E.2d 585, 593-94 (Ohio 1987) (rejecting statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 395-96 (Ohio
1987) (rejecting offer of statistical study), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 916 (1988); State v. Irick,
762 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tenn. 1988) (rejecting evidence of statistical compilation of all
homicide cases in Knox County from 1978-86), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072 (1989); Turner
v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490 (Va.) (rejecting defendant's offer of statistical
evidence), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 196,
201 (Va. 1987) (rejecting defendant's evidence of statistical study published in law review
article), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988).
70. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1108-10 (N.J. 1992).
71. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991).
72. See Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 465-68 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 398 (1993). In Parts V and VI of this
Article, we describe the New Jersey and Florida approaches to discrimination in death
sentencing and consider the light that they may shed on the plausibility of the impossibility
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Overall, though, McCleskey has reduced to near zero the level of judicial
oversight in prosecutorial and jury decision making in the administration of
the death penalty.
Another effect of McCleskey has been to shift the focus of academic
research on the death penalty. Instead of developing statistical evidence, the
focus is now on extended interviews with jurors who have participated in the
life-and-death decision making of penalty trials.73 The early results indicate
that this research will shed substantial light on the plausibility of the
inevitability and impossibility hypotheses.
The McCleskey decision has drawn considerable criticism. Numerous
commentators have expressed serious concern with the Court's placement of
an implicit imprimatur on racial discrimination in such an important area of
the criminal law.74 Particularly offensive to African-Americans is the
perception, based upon McCleskey, that the Constitution authorizes
prosecutors and jurors to provide minority communities with less protection
than it provides white communities. 5
IV. Congressional Reform Efforts
Although McCleskey has closed down judicial discussion of race in
capital cases, it did not block further consideration by Congress. Indeed,
McCleskey itself suggested that claims of discrimination might best be
presented to legislatures for corrective action.76
and inevitability hypotheses. See infra notes 174-216 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993) (evaluating anecdotal evidence
of jury decision making in capital cases).
74. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 370-93; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT
MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION 159-211 (1989); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1389
(1988); Anderson E. Bynam, Casenote, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments-The Death
Penalty Survives, 78 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1080, 1117-18 (1988); Jacqueline Cook,
Casenote, Coming Full Circle: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing Patterns in Capital
Punishment Cases, 56 UMKC L. REV. 387,397 (1988); Mary E. Holland, Note, McCleskey
v. Kemp: Racism and the Death Penalty, 20 CONN. L. REv. 1029, 1061 (1988); Kendra
Meinert, Note, Criminallnjustice: Continuing Racial Inequities in Death Penalty Sentencing,
22 Sw. U. L. REV. 1177, 1201-02 (1993).
75. See Kennedy, supra note 74, at 1394-95.
76. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319.
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InMcCleskey's wake, congressional concerns first stimulated a formal
assessment of the scope of the problem in American capital charging and
sentencing systems. In 1988, Congress directed the General Accounting
Office (the GAO) to study the issue and to determine if race-of-victim or
race-of-defendant discrimination influences the likelihood that defendants
will be sentenced to death. The GAO initially considered conducting one or
more empirical studies itself, but finally opted for "an evaluative synthe-
sis-a review and critique of existing research."I Toward that end, the
agency evaluated 28 empirical studies and discovered that in 82% of them,
the "race of [the] victim was found to influence the likelihood of being
charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty." 8 The results
of the GAO report clearly suggest that there is a problem, especially with
respect to race-of-victim discrimination.
Congressional concerns, substantiated by the GAO findings, led to a
series of congressional efforts to bypass McCleskey by relying on the
legislative power granted Congress under the Enabling Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9  Neither of the two proposed legislative
measures addresses the specific situation in Georgia or any other state. Nor
would they impose structural remedies of the type suggested by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens-requiring standards that limit the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in seeking death sentences and that narrow the class
of death-eligible cases." Instead, the measures are designed to give offend-
ers condemned to death the same right to challenge their individual death
sentences as racially motivated as is currently enjoyed by individuals
claiming discrimination under federal employment and housing laws.'
77. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
78. Id. at 5. The results on race-of-defendant discrimination were described as
"equivocal." Id. at 6.
79. The Enabling Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, empowers Congress to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, which includes the Equal Protection Clause. See
generally Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). There was, nevertheless, some
argument that Congress lacked power to "overrule" McCleskey and thatas a consequence, any
effort to do so would violate Article I and the Tenth Amendment. See 136 CONG. REC.
S6900-01 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
80. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 367 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
81. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988).
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The first of these proposed measures, known as the Racial Justice
Act,' is presented in Appendix A of this Article. It would allow a
condemned prisoner to attack his death sentence if its imposition "furthers
a racially discriminatory pattern" of death sentencing in the offender's
jurisdiction.' The bill embraces a risk-based model of proof patterned on
Justice Blackmun's McCleskey dissent and authorizes the use of statistical
methods of proof comparable to those used in jury venire discrimination
cases.' The law would also require states to maintain sufficient data on all
potential capital cases in order to allow capital defendants and the State to
present and defend claims under the Act.'
Under the Racial Justice Act, a defendant could establish a prima facie
case by using the State's data to show a racially discriminatory pattern of
death sentencing, presumably after adjustment for the leading aggravating
circumstances.86 The State could rebut this showing by presenting "clear
and convincing evidence that identifiable and pertinent nonracial factors
persuasively explain the observable racial. disparities comprising the
pattern. "I Absent such a rebuttal by the State, a' defendant would be
entitled to relief from his death sentence if his case fell within a category of
cases in which a racial disparity existed to his disadvantage.88
The second proposal, known as the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act, 9 is presented in Appendix B of this Article in the form that was
82. S. 1696, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S12,161 (daily ed. Sept. 28,
1989) [hereinafter Racial Justice Act]; see H.R. 4422, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
REC. El 175 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988).
83. Racial Justice Act, supra note 82, § 2922(a), 135 CONG. REC. S12,161. For
discussion of the Racial Justice Act, see M. Shanara Gilbert, Racism and Retrenchment in
Capital Sentencing: Judicial and Congressional Haste Toward the Ultimate Injustice, 18
N.Y.U. R v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51, 61-66 (1990-91); Angela Dorn et al., Comment, Too
Much Justice: A Legislative Response to McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
437, 461-528 (1989).
84. See Racial Justice Act, supra note 82, § 2922(b), 135 CONG. REc. S12,161.
85. Id. § 2923, 135 CONG. REc. S12,162.
86. Id. § 2922(c)(1), 135 CONG. REc. S12,161-62.
87. Id. § 2922(c)(2), 135 CONG. REC. S12,162.
88. Id. § 2922(a), 135 CONG. REc. S12,161.
89. H.R.2851, 102dCong., 1stSess. (1991) [hereinafter Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act].
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adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives on April 20, 1994. 90 Like
the Racial Justice Act, it would provide a condemned prisoner the opportuni-
ty to challenge his death sentence with statistical proof of racial discrimina-
tion9!' and would also employ a risk-based model of proof.2 The principal
differences between the two proposals are that the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act provides more detailed specifications for proving a prima
facie case (e.g., a large and statistically significant race disparity)93 and
merely guarantees a claimant access to whatever relevant data have already
been collected by state officials, without imposing any additional data collec-
tion requirements on the State.'
Congressional opposition to the two measures has taken several paths.
One series of arguments turns primarily on methodological concerns. First,
in contrast to the talk of inevitability in McCleskey, congressional critics
have argued that there is no trustworthy evidence that racial discrimination
is a problem in the American death sentencing system. 95 They have argued
that if anything, the evidence suggests that white defendants in fact are at
greater risk of receiving death sentences than are black defendants.'
90. For a thorough discussion of the proposed Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, see
Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act Be
Enacted to Substantially Diminish Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing?, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 777 (1990-91).
91. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921.
92. Id. § 2921(c).
93. See id. § 2921(b) (requiring statistical significance of racial disparities); id.
§ 2921(c) (allowing evidence that death sentences were "imposed significantly more
frequently" in white-victim or black-defendant cases).
94. Id. § 2922. The application of either of these statutes in Georgia clearly would
have entitled McCleskey to relief because his case fell within a subcategory of cases in which
there was a strong, statistically significant race-of-victim effect, both statewide and in Fulton
County. For background on the two proposals, see generally Death Penalty Legislation and
the Racial Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 4618 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
95. Senator Orrin Hatch from Utah stated in his argument against the Racial Justice Act
that "[a]uthoritative studies simply do not support the conclusion drawn by some of the
sponsors of this bill; namely, that racial animus is distorting the capital sentencing system.
If such animus exists, however, adequate safeguards exist to prevent and eliminate it." 136
CONG. REc. S6901 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
96. Senator Hatch cited a 1985 Department of Justice study that "established that,
rather than discriminating against blacks, capli]tal punishment has been disproportionately
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Second, the congressional critics have insisted that the higher risk of capital
punishment in white-victim cases is explained by nonracial factors. For
example, they have suggested that white-victim cases are more likely to
involve premeditated, predatory murders than are black-victim cases.'
The opposition has also invoked the "impossibility" rhetoric from the
language of the McCleskey opinion, as well as quota arguments drawn from
a recent congressional debate to repeal by legislation a Supreme Court
decision limiting the use of statistical evidence in Title VII employment
discrimination cases." Opponents of the Racial Justice Act first argued
that its adoption would constitute a de facto abolition of the death penalty.
In the words of Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, "You cannot support the
availability of capital punishment, while supporting the Racial Justice
Act. "99 This argument presupposes that under the proposed standards for
inflicted upon white defendants .... According to the DOJ statistics, whites are more likely
to be sentenced to death, more likely to be actually executed, and less likely to be released
from death r6w." Id. at S6902. For comments to the same effect in the House of
Representatives, see 137 CONG. REc. H8141 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (arguing generally against Fairness in Death Sentencing Act).
97. Senator Hatch noted:
The reason that crimes involving white victims result in more death
sentences than crimes involving black victims is not the result of racial animus
in the criminal justice system. Murders involving white victims, according to
studies conducted by the Stanford Law Review and the State of Florida, are
more often premeditated crimes linked to rape and robbery. Murders
involving black victims are more often "crimes of passion" committed in
domestic setting[s] without aggravating factors such as rape or robbery.
Because whites are simply more often the victims of murders involving
aggravated circumstances and premeditation, these crimes more often result
in death sentences.
1984 DOJ studies show that whites are 77 percent of the victims in rape
cases and 89 percent of the victims of robbery cases. Therefore, it is only to
be expected that a higher number of whites would be the victims in aggravated
murders associated with other felonies-the particular form of murder that
leads to the death penalty.
134 CONG. REC. S7561 (daily ed. June 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
98. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) ("Racial
imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force does not, without more, establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact .... A contrary ruling on this point would almost
inexorably lead to the use of numerical quotas in the workplace, a result that Congress and
this Court have rejected repeatedly in the past.").
99. 137 CONG. REC. S8293 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
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evaluating statistical evidence, black defendants and defendants with white
victims would always prevail and their death sentences would be vacat-
ed. 11 Since such cases constitute the overwhelming majority of cases, the
critics contended that death sentencing would come to a grinding halt.
The proponents of the de facto abolition argument give three reasons
for their views. The first is that statistical proof of discrimination is
inherently untrustworthy and cannot accurately detect whether discrimination
has occurred.'0 ' The second claim is that the models of proof contempla-
100. "I submit that every jurisdiction to whom this law would apply would be subject
to a finding of a statistical imperfection.. .. " 136 CONG. REC. S6892 (daily ed. May 24,
1990) (statement of Sen. Graham). Opponents of the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act
argued that it would abolish the death penalty "because it imposes a burden on the prosecution
that is too onerous and places an expense on the taxpayers of this Nation that is too great."
137 CONG. REc. H7899 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991) (statement of Rep. Riggs). According to
this argument, the Act more truthfully could be called the "Death Penalty Repeal Act." Id.
at H7905 (statement of Rep. McCollum).
101. Senator Hatch noted:
[T]he statistics do not measure the culpability of the defendant.
Statistics do not measure the suffering of the victims. Statistics do not even
measure racial bias, as shown by the evidence that whites more often than
blacks suffer the death penalty. Statistics have no place in the sentencing
courtroom.
Statistics measure quantities, but the real differences in this area [the
disparity between those who are sentenced to death for killing a white victim
versus a black victim] are qualitative. It is the type of murder that is different
and causes the harsher penalty. Once again, juries can take these qualitative
factors into account. Statistics cannot.
134 CONG. REc. S7562 (daily ed. June 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
"Murderers wreak their havoc without regard to racial statistics and ought to be
brought to justice without regard to racial statistics." 136 CONG. REc. S6899 (daily ed. May
24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch). "[AIlleged statistical discrepancies, even if assumed
valid, do not prove that a single judge, juror, or prosecutor was influenced by racial animus.
Statistics are simply not evidence of any relevance to the specific case before the judge and
jury." Id. at S6900.
[S]tatistics have no place in the criminal justice equation. Murderers must be
judged and sentenced without regard to statistics. Murderers must be
sentenced according to the facts of their own particular case. Aggravating and
mitigating factors must be fully weighted by an impartial jury. This is what
juries now do. Statistical justice, however, would take the determination out
of the hands of juries and leave it in the hands of a battery of experts.
Id. at S6902.
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ted by the proposed statutes are so broad that statistical evidence of any
racial disparity, however small, would entitle all defendants who were black
or whose victims were white to obtain relief without requiring them to prove
racism in their own cases."t2 This problem is alleged to be particularly
acute in small jurisdictions with few death-eligible cases and very few death
sentences imposed." 3 Finally, because the measures would be retroactive,
Proponents of this legislation point to the use of statistical evidence in
the area of employment discrimination as the basis for this legislation.
However, the criminal justice system is inherently different from the
employment process. As the Supreme Court has said, the very nature of the
capital sentencing decision, and the relationship of statistics to that decision,
are fundamentally different from the corresponding elements for a [T]itle VII
employment discrimination case.
Id. at S6884 (statement of Sen. Graham).
102. Senator Strom Thurmond from South Carolina argued that death row inmates will
use statistics to overturn all death sentences without having to show any racism in their own
cases:
For example, a Federal court would be required to overturn every
death sentence in a particular State if a study is presented to the court which
shows the death penalty is applied in a disproportionate manner. Every death
sentence-including the death sentence of a white defendant, who murdered a
white victim,' found guilty by an all white jury, and sentenced by a white
judge-would be overturned. The same would hold true if every person
involved in the case was black. This makes no sense whatsoever.
136 CONG. REc. S6888 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). Senator
Bob Graham from Florida argued that death penalty cases
have been reviewed by all of those judicial forums and have been found, as an
individual matter, to not be subject to the charge of racial discrimination. If
there were any evidence in the individual case that that had occurred, the case
would be dismissed or the individual would be afforded some new opportunity
for justice.
In all of these cases, almost by definition, there has been no evidence
of racial discrimination on the facts of the individual case that would warrant
such relief, and so the look turns not to the individual, but rather to the
system, to try to find that the system contains some invidious racially]
discriminatory pattern.
Id. at S6893 (statement of Sen. Graham).
103. Representative James Sensenbrenner from Wisconsin argued the following:
[S]tatistics ... really do not take into account what happens in small
jurisdictions, rural jurisdictions, where a capital crime is committed very
infrequently, say once every 5 or 6 or 7 years.
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the critics argue that the statutes would overturn otherwise settled cases
decided years ago and would thereby put virtually all death sentences at
risk.'" The only way to avoid these consequences, the argument
continues, would be to adopt quotas, which would make race an outcome-
determinative factor and would produce an even more arbitrary and
discriminatory system than we now have. 10 5
Other arguments against the proposed legislation range from the
conceptual to the technical. One conceptual objection is that the legislative
proposals run against strong American traditions that preserve maximum
discretion for jurors and prosecutors."o6 Another is that the solution to
... Once someone is sentenced to death in one of these small low-
crime jurisdictions, the race of that person and the race of the victim would so
skew the statistical formulation that it would be very hard to put anybody to
death of another race who committed the same or similar kind of crime.
137 CONG. REC. H8141 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
104. Representative Bill McCollum from Florida argued that because the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act was retroactive, "[tihe more than 2,450 existing capital sentences
would all be open to challenge under this unequal and unjust approach, regardless of the facts
of the case or the guilt of the convicted killer." Id. at H7905 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991)
(statement of Rep. McCollum). Representative Jim Kolbe from Arizona stated that the
retroactivity of the Act would "wip[e] out hundreds of convictions." Id. at H7911 (statement
of Rep. Kolbe). And Senator Gordon J. Humphrey from New Hampshire declared that "[a]
defendant can conclusively avoid the death penalty by selecting any past period of years
which produces sentencing statistics that do not conform with the standard of strict racial
parity." 136 CONG. REC. S6896 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
105. Senator Humphrey stated:
Clearly, it is legally impossible for the States to control the racial
breakdown of sentencing outcomes. The only way they could possibly do so
would be to deliberately use race as the decisive factor in choosing to seek the
death penalty or not in each case. In other words, a bill which calls itself the
"Racial Justice Act" would actually require the death sentence to be allocated
precisely on the basis of race. This is both unconstitutional and immoral.
136 CoNG. REc. S6896 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator
Graham concluded that the Racial Justice Act would "make the system much more arbitrary
and capricious than even the proponents of this bill would argue it is today." Id. at S6884
(statement of Sen. Graham).
106. Senator Graham argued that the Racial Justice Act would "unravel some basic
tenets of our American criminal justice system: One, the State's interest in protecting its
citizens from murderers; two, prosecutorial discretion recognized in every State; and, three,
the jury system in general." Id. He explained:
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such problems should develop in the states. Opponents also argue that
the proposed measures are bad policy-for example, they do not seek to
prevent discrimination in the future and only focus on remedying past
discrimination." 8 In addition, it has been suggested that eliminating race-
of-victim discrimination would have the perverse effect of bringing more
black defendants to death row because most black-victim cases involve black
defendants." ° A final, pragmatic argument is that either proposal would
[H]istorically, prosecutors have been entrusted with wide discretionary
powers. These powers include the decision to seek the death penalty where the
law permits....
This power is inherent in our criminal justice system. To adopt this bill
would call for a complete overhaul of that system, an overhaul which I do not
believe this Senate should be prepared to impose on every State in this Nation.
Id. Senator Grassley argued that "Congress cannot exercise discretion for prosecutors,judges
and juries. And, prosecutors and judges cannot decide for juries-based on some arbitrary
racial quota-who is to receive the death penalty and who is not." Id. at S6907 (statement
of Sen. Grassley).
107. "lA]n analysis of these issues can best be conducted in the individual states ...
[Ihe proper role of Congress is to encourage our States to look at their entire justice systems
and for the States to formulate their own responses to any racial or ethnic bias." Id. at S6885
(statement of Sen. Graham).
108. See id. at S6897 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
109. Senator Hatch read the following statement by Professor Richard Lempert of the
University of Michigan:
If prosecutors seek to resolve those racial disparities that turn on the
victim's race by consciously suppressing this factor in deciding whether to
seek death, the overwhelming number of those who suffer for it will be blacks.
The reason is that most killers with black victims are themselves blacks, so any
increase in the death penalty rate for those who kilil blacks will fall
disproportionately on black defendants. This is likely to be true even if
discrimination on the basis of the defendant's race is at the same time
eliminated.
Id. at S6900.
The measures also would apply to treason and hijacking where race usually is no
problem:
[Who are the victims of treason? Are we not all? Who are the victims of
airline hijacking or of drug-kingpin activity? This bill, if enacted, would force
the criminal justice system to consider these things. It would inject the factor
of race into the operation of the criminal justice system in cases, such as
prosecutions for treason, where no one has ever even alleged that race is a
problem.
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add complexity, expense, and delay to an already burdensome process of
judicial review. The result would simply be too much for the states to bear.
The plausibility of these different arguments varies substantially. The
concerns about additional cost and delay are legitimate, although we consider
the magnitude of the cost estimates to be exaggerated. The cost involved
will depend on the complexity of the model of proof used to assess the
evidence in individual cases."' It is also implausible that such additional
cost and delay would be sufficient to trigger the legislative repeal of capital
punishment in the leading death penalty states. In addition, as noted
above," the long-term effects of eliminating discrimination from death
sentencing may be to reduce the number of death sentences imposed, with
great savings, and to speed up the disposition of those that are imposed. The
ultimate question, of course, is whether the costs of removing the cloud of
discrimination that currently hangs over the system are too much to pay. A
similar calculus is appropriate in assessing the importance that should be




The proposals also could carry over to burglary and drug crimes:
As the Supreme Court noted, this notion of statistical justice could be
applied elsewhere as well. Can you imagine statistics about racial factors in
drug busts overturning our war on drugs? Can you imagine statistics about
racial factors in burglary convictions invalidating those prosecutions? And,
if racial factors are accepted despite their lack of relevancy, what happens
when statistics tend to show that physical attractiveness influences some
prosecutions? The proposed bill does not extend that far, but the Supreme
Court is on target when it states that there is simply no limiting principle with
regard to the type of challenge created by this provision.
Id. at S6900.
110. In Part VI, we consider a parsimonious model that involves much less data and is
less complex than McCleskey's approach. See infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 8.
112. Senator Hatch's argument about the absence of a limiting principle is unpersuasive.
See supra note 109. The principle underlying the two proposals is the same principle that
forms the basis of other federal antidiscrimination laws. However, the Senator's point
concerning the effect that an evenhanded death sentencing system would have on black
defendants invites a response. The argument assumes that equal treatment would result in a
higher death sentencing rate in black-victim cases (with primarily black defendants), rather
than a lower rate for the white-victim cases. See supra note 109. The outcome on this issue
is not obvious.
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An assessment of these tradeoffs calls for moral judgments for which
we have no special qualifications. By contrast, we believe that our expertise
and experience can shed light on the methodological arguments against the
two legislative proposals.
First, consider the claim that there is no reliable evidence of racial
discrimination in the American death penalty system."' This argument
simply ignores the substantial and statistically reliable evidence that race-of-
victim discrimination exists in many states."' Additionally, even though
the evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination is less widespread, there is
clear empirical evidence that it also exists in certain localities." 5 Congres-
sional critics of the proposals have attempted to refute this evidence by citing
In our analysis of the Georgia data from McCleskey, we estimated the changes that
would likely occur in an evenhanded system. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 155-56.
We developed the estimates based on the assumption that white-victim standards would be
applied to black-victim cases. Id. at 156. The results predicted a 23 % increase in the number
of death sentences in the black-victim cases and a 6% increase in the death sentencing rate
for all cases. Id. If the white-victim standard had been applied to all cases, the percentage
of black defendants on death row would have increased by 5 percentage points (from 53 % to
58%); if the black-victim standard had been applied to all cases, the proportion of blacks on
death row also would have increased by 5 percentage points. Id. The moral calculus by
which these data would lead one to prefer a racially discriminatory system to an evenhanded
one is not clear to us.
113. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
114. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 (noting pattern of racial disparities in
charging and sentencing in death-eligible cases).
115. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 179 (finding statistically significant race-of-
defendant effects in prosecutorial decisions in rural Georgia); id. at 181 (finding statistically
significant race-of-defendant effects in Ocmulgee, Georgia Judicial Circuit); id. at258 (noting
that Sam Gross and Robert Mauro found statistically significant race-of-defendant effects in
Arkansas from 1976-80); id. at 261 (noting that Barry Nakell and Kenneth Hardy found
statistically significant race-of-defendant effects at various stages of North Carolina's system
in 1977 and 1978); id. at 328 (finding statewide race-of-defendant effects in Georgia's white-
victim cases that involve highly aggravated crime or contemporaneous felony, but not
significant beyond. 10 level); id. at362 n.54 (finding statistically significant race-of-defendant
effect in highly aggravated white-victim cases prosecuted in rural Georgia judicial circuits).
A recent report by the staff of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
indicates that while 24% of the persons convicted of participating in drug enterprises were
black, 78% of those chosen for death penalty prosecutions were black. STAFF OF HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
103D CONG., 2D SESS., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROSECUTIONS
1988-1994, at 2 (Comm. Print 1994).
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a single Justice Department study that, according to Senator Orrin Hatch and
other lawmakers, proves that "whites are more likely to be sentenced to
death, more likely to be actually executed, and less likely to be released
from death row" than black defendants." 6 In fact, the Justice Depart-
ment's study contains absolutely no data to support such a claim." 7 The
study reports merely that of the prisoners on death row in 1985, 57% were
white and 42% were black and that of 50 prisoners executed between 1977
and 1985, 33 were white and 17 were black."' Obviously, these figures
say nothing about the "likelihood" of either outcome because the report gives
no data whatsoever about the racial composition of the pools of defendants
from which the convicted and executed defendants were selected." 9
Another very misleading claim is that the race-of-victim disparities
reported in the literature are statistical artifacts that reflect a higher level of
"death-worthiness" in the typical white-victim case than is found in the
typical black-victim case. This claim is misleading because it falsely
suggests that the race-of-victim disparities reported in the literature are
unadjusted, i.e., calculated without adjustment for the many legitimate case
characteristics that affect the typical level of criminal culpability in black-
and white-victim cases. In fact, the more rigorously conducted studies that
116. 136 CONG. REC. S6902 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
117. See Capital Punishment, 1985, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of
Justice/Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1986, at 1, 5-8.
118. Id. at6-7.
119. A slightly more relevant comparison would be between the proportion of blacks
among those individuals arrested for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter (for example,
55% in 1991) and the proportion of blacks on death row (42%). FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 1991, at 231 (1992). However, little can be concluded from these data for three
reasons. First, the death sentencing rates being compared are among people arrested for
murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. In this population, a much lower proportion of black
defendants than white defendants are death-eligible. We estimate that only about 10% of the
cases covered by these statistics are death-eligible. Second, and more important, the death
sentencing rate in black-defendant cases is suppressed by race-of-victim discrimination.
Because the victim in the vast majority of black-defendant cases is black, the
disproportionately low death sentencing rate in black-victim cases suppresses the overall
sentencing rate in the black-defendant cases. Third, the scope of race-of-defendant
discrimination can be reliably assessed only after statistical adjustment is made for legitimate
background factors affecting the level of aggravation in the cases and the race of the victim.
This point applies to any analysis of racial discrimination in capital punishment, whether the
focus is on the race of the victim or the race of the defendant.
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reveal race-of-victim effects thoroughly control for the differences in the
aggravation levels (for example, rape, premeditiation, murders accompanied
by robberies) of the cases included in the analyses. 2 ° All of the race-of-
victim effects discussed in this Article and in the literature generally are
estimated after accounting for the very factors that critics say would, if
examined, explain the disparities.12' In our Georgia study, we observed
strong race-of-victim effects in a wide variety of analyses using many
different combinations of background controls-one of which involved 230
such variables." In fact, we were unable to generate a single analysis that
did not demonstrate statistically significant statewide race-of-victim effects.
Nor could the State of Georgia point to such an analysis, for the simple
reason that the State's expert testified that he never attempted to construct a
model that would show whether there were race effects in the system."
Other methodological arguments by opponents of the two legislative
proposals are somewhat less implausible. 24 However, they are based in
varying degrees on a misunderstanding of (a) the requirements of the
legislative proposals, (b) the function of statistical proof of discrimination in
general, and (c) the kinds of factual inferences that statistical evidence can
support in individual cases. At most, those arguments might justify the
substitution of a more conservative model of proof than is contemplated by
the current legislative proposals.
As background to this discussion, it is useful to consider the distinc-
tions between the different methods or models of proof that currently are
used in other areas of the law to establish purposeful discrimination in
individual cases. The first distinction is between models based on direct and
circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence models require eyewitness
testimony or admissions by the defendant that directly support a finding of
120. Some studies also control for the socioeconomic status of both the defendant and
the victim. See BALDUS El AL., supra note 23, at 587-601.
121. The GAO report on capital punishment describes in detail the methods of statistical
control used in all the studies that it surveyed and notes that race-of-victim effects are
observed in studies with both strong and weak controls for factors affecting the aggravation
level of the cases. GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 3, 5.
122. See BALDUS El AL., supra note 23, at 317.
123. As far as we are aware, no analysis has been published using our Georgia data
(which are publicly available at the University of Michigan) that does not demonstrate a
statewide race-of-victim effect.
124. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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discrimination-for example, an employer's remark that "Hispanics are
lazy." Today, such evidence is rare, and courts routinely rely on circum-
stantial evidence models, of which there are several. Most start with a prima
facie case, which under some models can be established by qualitative
evidence, whereas other models focus initially on statistical evidence."z
Virtually all circumstantial evidence models employ a series of presumptions
and burden shifts that progressively narrow and sharpen the factual inquiry.
They also vary in terms of the ultimate factual inference required. Under
some, proof establishing a significant risk of discrimination will suffice (we
call models of this type "risk-based"), whereas others require an actual
finding that race was: (a) a motivating factor, (b) a substantial or significant
factor, or (c) a but-for factor in the decision that adversely affected the
claimant (we call models principally of this type "causation-based"). 1
Both the Racial Justice Act and the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act
employ risk-based models. These models rely on statistical evidence to
establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination among a
subgroup of cases that implicates the defendant's case. Such a prima facie
showing shifts to the State the burden of proving that the racial disparities
125. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), prescribed the most
widely used Title VII model for proving purposeful discrimination in individual cases. See
id. at 802. Its prima facie case is based solely on qualitative circumstantial evidence. Id.
No models of which we are aware limit proof to direct evidence.
126. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), usefully illustrates the
distinctions among a "motivating" factor, id. at 244 (opinion of Brennan, J.), a "substantial"
factor, id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment), and a "but-for" factor. Id. at 240 (opinion of Brennan, J.). The standards of
causation applied by the courts vary. For a survey of various standards under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988), see, e.g., Jordan v. Dellway Villa, Ltd., 661
F.2d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding defendant liable if race "played a part" in his decision
to reject plaintiff), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008 (1982); Marable v. H. Walker & Assocs.,
644 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) (holding defendant liable if race was "one
significant factor considered by the defendant in dealing with the plaintiff"); Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding defendant liable if race was
"even one of the motivating factors"); United States v. Mitchell, 580 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding defendant liable if race "was a consideration and played some role in the real
estate transaction"). In discrimination cases challenging the selection of a venire or grand
jury on the basis of statistical evidence, the courts use a risk-based model that requires no
evidence of causation in the individual defendant's case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 494-95 (1977) (explaining statistical testfor Fourteenth Amendment grand jury selection
claims).
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supporting the claimant's case can be explained by nonracial factors."V
The ultimate factual issue is whether the evidence supports an inference of
purposeful racial discrimination within that group of cases. If the answer is
yes, the defendant is entitled to relief from his death sentence. Although a
showing of purposeful discrimination by a prosecutor or jury in a claimant's
case would clearly justify relief, neither legislative proposal requires an
inference that race was actually a motivating factor in the defendant's
particular case.
The methodological objections to the models of proof in the two
proposals raise three issues: First, what proof should be required to support
a prima facie case? Second, what defenses should be available to the states,
and how likely are they to prevail? Third, are risk-based models of proof
of the type contemplated by the two proposals desirable, or would a
causation-based model of proof be a more appropriate basis for remedying
discrimination in individual cases?
A. Requirements for a Prima Facie Case
It is important to recognize that the statistical methodology employed
by the two legislative proposals is not foreign to the federal courts. Federal
judges regularly encounter similar methods of proof in other types of
discrimination cases," and when faced with issues of proof that arise
under the two proposals, those judges would likely apply the standards used
to resolve similar questions outside the criminal law.
A judicial finding that a death sentence "was imposed based on race"
within the meaning of section 2921(a) of the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence either (a) that race
was a motivating factor in an individual claimant's case or (b) that capital
punishment was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner in
the "jurisdiction in question."' 29  When read as a whole, section 2921
127. See Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921; Racial Justice Act,
supra note 82, § 2922, 135 CONG. REc. S12,161-62. For a discussion of the role of direct
and qualitative evidence under the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, see infra note 129 and
accompanying text.
128. DAvID C. BALDUS & JAMES W. L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OFDISCRIMINATION
(1980) summarizes this jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to employment law.
129. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(c). Although the
following discussion tracks the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, it applies with equal force
to the earlier Racial Justice Act. It is also worth noting that in congressional floor debates
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leaves open the possibility that a prima facie case could be based on direct
evidence, such as an admission of purposeful discrimination by a prosecutor.
The more commonly contemplated approach, however, would be a prima
facie case established with statistical evidence under sections 2921(b) and
(c), which contemplate evidence that death sentences were being imposed
"significantly more frequently" in cases involving victims or defendants of
one race than another 30 and that the disparity supporting the inference is
"statistically significant."'' Moreover, the disparity must be estimated
after adjustment is made for the presence of the statutory aggravating factors
present in all of the relevant cases.1 12  In short, the statistical disparity
supporting an inference of discrimination must be both practically and
statistically significant.
Small statistical disparities that fail to satisfy these tests are not enough
to support such an inference. Critics nevertheless contend that minor
differences in the number or percentage of death sentences that a state has
imposed in factually similar categories of cases involving defendants (or
victims) of different races will require the state to shoulder a difficult burden
of disproving discrimination.'33 More specifically, those critics argue that
such minor disparities would be sufficient to demonstrate that the death
and in the media, the proposed Fairness in Death Sentencing Act is uniformly referred to as
the Racial Justice Act.
130. Id. § 2921(c).
131. Id. § 2921(b).
132. Id. § 2921(d). Under Title VII there is a small-firm exception to the requirement
of statistical significance that might apply under the two proposals. It has been applied when
(a) an employer's workplace is so small that substantial disparities suggestive of discrimina-
tion exist, but fail to achieve statistical significance because of small sample size, and (b)
there exists in the record other qualitative or quantitative evidence to support an inference of
discrimination. The rationale of the exception is that many forms of evidence are relevant
to an inference of discrimination and that rigid application of a statistical significance
requirement could immunize very small firms from claims based on statistical evidence even
when, in fact, they purposefully discriminated. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 128, § 9.12
(Cum. Supp. 1987). In the death sentencing context, by similar reasoning, the statistical
significance requirement may be appropriately relaxed when because of small sample size,
a demonstrated substantial racial disparity fails to achieve statistical significance and there is
other convincing evidence to support the inference of discrimination. For a description of
a similar approach suggested by former Chief Justice Barkett of the Florida Supreme Court,
see infra note 207 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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penalty is being imposed "significantly more frequently" in cases of one race
than another under section 2921(c) of the Act."3
This argument is simply wrong. When an observed racial disparity in
a state's death sentencing rate is small or is based on a small number of
cases, it is not, by itself, sufficient to obligate the State to disprove
discrimination. Such minor numerical disparities cannot serve to establish,
as section 2921(b) requires, that "race was a statistically significant factor in
decisions to seek or to impose the sentence of death. ' 35 Consider, for
example, a state in which the death-row population consists of 6 inmates, 4
of whose cases involve a white victim, while only 40 % of the death-eligible
-cases in the state involve a white victim. Or consider a state in which death
row consists of 100 prisoners, 43 of whose cases involve a white victim,
while 40% of the death-eligible cases from which they were selected have
a white victim. Common sense suggests that neither of these patterns
represents a situation in which the death penalty is being imposed "signifi-
cantly more frequently" upon killers of white victims.1 6  Any sort of
responsible statistical analysis will lead to exactly the same conclusion:
Numerical differences as small as the ones described above are not
statistically significant, as required by section 2921(b), and would not by
themselves support a prima facie case of racial discrimination.'37
134. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(c).
135. Id. § 2921(b).
136. Id. § 2921(c).
137. Does this analysis mean that racial discrimination can never be proven in cases with
small death row populations, thereby removing such states from the scrutiny of the proposed
legislation? The answer is no. It is true that in such a jurisdiction, statistical evidence, with
no other supporting evidence, would fail to establish a prima facie case. The legislation
appears to contemplate, however, the use of other forms of evidence, both qualitative and
quantitative, such as racist remarks by a prosecutor. See supra note 129 and accompanying
text. Under such circumstances, a court could find a prima facie case even if the statistical
disparity is not statistically significant-if it is substantial and there is other relevant evidence
that supports the inference of discrimination.
In considering the role of "statistical significance," it is also important to recognize
that it is a flexible concept. To be sure, there are certain conventions among social scientists
and applied statisticians regarding the level of assurance or degree of statistical significance
that must be present (usually the risk that the result could occur by chance must be 5% or
less) in order to establish that a correlation between variables is more than the product of
chance. However, legislators contemplating the use of a risk-based model as a device to
prevent racially infected sentences are not bound by such conventions. Depending upon how
vigilant they want to be in light of other competing considerations, legislators can specify a
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Small numerical differences like these could readily occur by chance
in a criminal justice system that was not discriminating on the grounds of
race. Ordinary statistical procedures do not permit conclusions of racial
discrimination to be drawn solely on the basis of small samples (for
example, 4 out of 6 cases) or on the basis of small differences in death
sentencing rates between racial groups even when the sample size is not
small (for example, 43 out of 100 cases as compared to 40 out of 100). To
the contrary, the major function of tests of statistical significance, the type
that would be applied under the Act,' is to distinguish disparities that are
real from those that may simply be attributable to chance.
This discussion leads us to ask: "What type of disparities are we likely
to observe in the various states?" On the basis of the studies that the GAO
report summarizes, we are likely to see strong statewide race-of-victim
disparities in some states, as we did in Georgia, but quite unlikely to see
comparable race-of-defendant effects.'39 We are also likely to see quite
different results in the different localities of individual states. For example,
our research from Georgia showed no consistent statewide evidence of race-
of-defendant discrimination.Y" Those overall results, however, masked
data from one judicial district that did show strong race-of-defendant
effects.'" I  Those data also included evidence of race-of-defendant
discrimination among a number of rural prosecutors. 2 It is in areas like
these that the evidence is likely to support an inference that a sentence "was
imposed based on race" within the meaning of section 2921(a).
B. Defenses Available to the State
There are four possible defenses available to the States under the
Fairness in Death Sentencing Act. These defenses would ensure that if a
state's capital sentencing system is applied evenhandedly, it will be able to
overcome the effort of a claimant to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Indeed, the first of the four defenses is a demonstration that
greater or lesser degree of statistical significance as a prerequisite to establishing a prima
facie case.
138. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(b).
139. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
140. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 328.
141. Id. at 181.
142. Id. at 179.
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the magnitude or statistical significance of any disparities established by the
defendant's evidence are not sufficient to support a prima facie case.
However, in cases in which the defendant does establish a prima facie
case, section 2921(e) contemplates a second possible defense by allowing the
State to establish "by a preponderance of the evidence" that identifiable and
pertinent nonracial factors persuasively explain the racial disparities that
might otherwise support the inference that race was the basis for the death
sentence.143 There are a variety of accepted statistical techniques that the
State may use for this purpose.'" If the observed racial disparity support-
ing the defendant's prima facie case is merely a statistical artifact reflecting,
for example, differences in the aggravation levels of typical white- and
black-victim cases, then the observed disparity will lose its practical and
statistical significance. Generally accepted statistical procedures provide a
solid basis for estimating the likelihood that the racial disparities that finally
emerge from the analysis are indeed the product of racial discrimination and
are not explained by different levels of aggravation among the various
subgroups of cases that are being compared.
Certainly, because section 2921(d) of the Act requires a defendant to
"take into account ... evidence of the statutory aggravating factors" when
attempting to establish a prima facie case, it effectively requires the death-
sentenced offender to use statistical techniques unless direct evidence of a
discriminatory purpose is available. 5  However, section 2921(e) also
permits the State to conduct similar analyses with respect to mitigating and
other nonstatutory aggravating factors, a process that might succeed in
explaining the disparities initially estimated by the defendant.
Generally accepted statistical procedures of the type contemplated by
the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act are employed in a wide variety of other
legal and nonlegal contexts in which it is important to distinguish between
what is apparent and what is real. For example, such procedures provide the
principal medical evidence establishing a connection between cigarette
smoking and cancer and between cholesterol and heart attacks.'
143. See Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(e).
144. For a sampling, see BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 46-66.
145. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(d).
146. See THOMAS R. DAWBER, THE FRAMINGHAM STUDY: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF
ATHEROSCLEROTIC DISEASE 121-41 (1980) (noting overwhelming evidence that blood
cholesterol level is powerful factor in development of coronary heart disease, myocardial
infarction, and angina pectoris); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING
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Moreover, similar procedures are widely used in lawsuits, particularly in
employment discrimination cases involving claims of purposeful discrimina-
tion in employee hiring, promotion, and discharge. In those settings, the use
of generally accepted statistical methods of proof has been explicitly and
unanimously endorsed by the United States Supreme Court. 47 These pro-
cedures provide an indispensable basis for the valid and just assessment of
claims of race- and gender-based discrimination.' Moreover, defendants
in discrimination cases are often successful in rebutting plaintiffs' prima
facie cases with objective and relevant nonracial or gender-neutral fac-
tors. 49  We fully expect such defenses to be similarly deployed in the
context of the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act-often with considerable
success.
In comparing potential claims under the Fairness in Death Sentencing
Act with comparable Title VII cases-those involving special qualifications
for hiring or promotion-it is worth noting that the employment discrimina-
tion plaintiff carries as part of her prima facie case the burden of accounting
for the most important nonracial factors (for example, training and
experience) that are relevant to the personnel decisions at issue in the
case."5 As long as the relevant data are available to the parties, this Title
AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5-31 to 5-32 (1979) (presenting
evidence of linkage between smoking and lung cancer).
147. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 397-404 (1986) (opinion of Brennan, J.)
(applying but-for causation-based model of proof); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977) (same); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977)
(applying risk-based model of proof). The argument that statistical methods of proof may be
capable of proving purposeful discrimination in employment and housing but not in death
sentencing is completely unpersuasive. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 375-80
(critiquing methodologically based reasoning of McCleskey). Even Justice Scalia, who voted
with the majority in McCleskey, considers this claim unpersuasive. See supra note 46.
Also, a recently published biography of Justice Powell, who wrote the majority
opinion in McCleskey, indicates that he now believes that McCleskey was wrongly decided
and that he would "vote the other way in any capital case." JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994).
148. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 128, § 8.021 (1980 & Cum. Supp. 1987)
(discussing use of multiple regression models in disparate treatment and disparate impact
cases).
149. See id. at 103-04 (Cum. Supp. 1987); 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.83 (1993).
150. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 398-400; HazlewoodSch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 308 n.13;
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20, 342 n.23 (1977).
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VII requirement is appropriate and imposes no undue hardship on plaintiffs.
As noted above, section 2921(d) would impose a similar burden on offenders
presenting claims under the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act by requiring
that any showing of racial disparities take into account the presence of
statutory aggravating factors to the extent that such data are "compiled and
made publicly available.""'
The argument that claimants will always prevail in claims brought under
the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act overlooks a simple fact.152  After
taking into account pertinent nonracial factors, it would be very unlikely to
see evidence of racial discrimination unless racial factors were in fact exerting
a significant influence on capital sentencing in the jurisdiction. As a result,
states usually will not lose cases under the Act if their systems are applied in
an evenhanded fashion. Also, for reasons that we discuss below, some
claimants will be unsuccessful in their claims even if they can present
unrebutted evidence that in general, the racial characteristics of the cases are
a significant influence in the application of the death penalty in the jurisdic-
tion. 5
3
The existing literature suggests that it is quite unlikely that statewide
claims of race-of-defendant discrimination will be successful although the pic-
ture may be quite different in particular subdivisions of the individual states
(where a particular prosecutor may, in fact, be engaged in an indefensible pat-
tern of racial discrimination)." 5 Moreover, we expect that as prosecutors
become more aware of their obligations to treat capital cases evenhandedly,
fewer and fewer discrimination claims of any type will be successful. On this
point, we note that our data from Georgia showed quite strong evidence of
statewide discrimination against black offenders before Furman v. Georgia
was decided in 1972.155 For the period from 1973 to 1980, however, we
observed no statewide evidence of race-of-defendant discrimination. 56 One
151. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(d). This defense would
create strong incentives for states to gather sufficient information on death-eligible cases in
order to rebut potential prima facie cases.
152. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing argument that claimants
always will prevail under Fairness in Death Sentencing Act).
153. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
155. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 148.
156. Id. at 150. Compare id. at 142 (charting pre-Furman results) with id. at 151
(charting post-Furman results).
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probable partial explanation for this change is that during the latter period,
more black jurors served on Georgia's juries and black defendants received
more competent legal representation because of the increased constitutional
protections required by the federal courts. It is also likely that with the
general decline of overt racism in the South, Georgia's prosecutors and
juries became more sensitive to the problem of racial discrimination and
sought to treat offenders more evenhandedly. If the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act were to become law, we would expect to see a similar
development over time with respect to the race of the victim.
It is also important to note that the statistical analysis needed to defend
a claim of discrimination requires-beyond data on the presence or absence
of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors-information on relatively
few factual circumstances relating to each case."5 Thus, there is little
basis for the claim that the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act would require
states to collect and maintain massive statistical data files. Once the required
data base for evaluating the system is in place, it will be available for use
with no further expense beyond routine updating. The suggestion that each
claim brought under the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act will require the
development from scratch of a vast new data base ignores this fact.
Even if the State could not overcome a statistical showing that in a
given category of capital cases, racial factors were influencing the sentences
imposed, a third defense remains potentially available through a demonstra-
tion either (a) that because of factual differences, the defendant's case should
not be included in the category of cases affected by the observed pattern of
discrimination or (b) that the defendant's race or the race of the victim is not
implicated by the observed pattern of discrimination. In either of these
circumstances, there would be no basis for inferring that the demonstrated
pattern of racial discrimination affected the defendant's sentence, and he
would be entitled to no relief. This type of defense can be quite potent.
Based upon the studies conducted to date, it seems quite likely that claimants
might be able to demonstrate the existence of race-based discrimination
within certain subsets of death-eligible cases. But this by no means leads to
an automatic conclusion that the defendant's own case was affected. For
example, our studies of Georgia indicated that although racial factors
affected the sentences imposed in moderately aggravated ("mid-range")
157. Our experience in conducting empirical studies of death sentencing systems in
Georgia, New Jersey, and Colorado suggests that about 15 to 20 factors would be required
beyond the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
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cases, there were no observable race effects related to either the race of the
defendant or the victim in highly aggravated cases that involved torture or
multiple victims. In the terminology of section 2921(a), such evidence
clearly would not support an inference that the sentences in those highly
aggravated cases were "imposed based on race,"'58 and therefore, such
sentences would be sustained under the proposed legislation.
Finally, it is important to note that even if there is evidence of a
statewide pattern of discrimination, the State would have a fourth, potentially
solid, defense if the evidence from the claimant's own judicial circuit or
district did not reflect a similar pattern of discrimination. What gave force
to McCleskey's claim of race-of-victim discrimination in his own case was
the combination of strong statewide evidence of discrimination among the
cases that were comparable to his and strong evidence of race-of-victim
discrimination in Fulton County. ' 9
C. The Pros and Cons of Causation-Based Models of Proof
in Individual Cases
A risk-based model of proof of the type applied by Justice Blackmun
in McCleskey and proposed in the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act and the
Racial Justice Act can clearly support a causal inference."t6 Specifically,
when the claimant establishes an unrebutted prima facie case, the evidence
supports an inference that race substantially influenced decisions in some
cases implicated by the analysis. Indeed, it is this causal inference that
arguably justifies relief for all cases so implicated because any one of the
sentences imposed in them may have been adversely affected by racial
discrimination. Stated differently, the unrebutted statistical proof of
discrimination creates a presumption that race adversely affected each
implicated case. Under a risk-based analysis, this presumption is irrebutta-
ble, and relief follows for all of the implicated cases. It is a legitimate
158. Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(a).
159. Our research from Georgia also indicated that the magnitude of racial disparities
in capital sentencing varies significantly from one judicial district or county to the next.
See supra note 115. Thus, a finding of discrimination in one district would provide no
basis for relief in a jurisdiction in which there is no evidence that race is influencing the
system.
160. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 351-53 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, supra note 89, § 2921(b)-(d); Racial Justice
Act, supra note 82, § 2922(b)-(c), 135 CONG. REC. S12,161-62.
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question, however, whether this presumption should be rebuttable by the
State. The following argument suggests that it should be.
By its very nature, statistical evidence is most meaningful with respect
to groups of cases. A presumption of discrimination established by
unrebutted statistical evidence concerning a group of cases applies equally
to each implicated case. However, as compelling as statistical evidence can
be with respect to a group of cases, it cannot definitively prove a causal
connection between race and the adverse decision in any specific case within
the group. Indeed, it normally will be almost certain that race adversely
affected only some of the implicated cases. Causation-based models seek to
identify the cases whose decisions were adversely affected by race. They are
distinguishable from risk-based models, therefore, because they contemplate
an additional inquiry into the specifics of the claimant's case. Such a model
would give the State an additional fifth defense by permitting it to show, on
the basis of evidence concerning how other similarly situated defendants
were treated, that regardless of the magnitude of the unrebutted disparity
suggesting a general pattern and practice of discrimination in the jurisdiction,
race played no role in the claimant's case.
Assume, for example, that the statistical evidence authoritatively
establishes a policy of race-of-defendant discrimination in a group of cases
that includes A, a black defendant. It is quite possible that the circumstances
of some of the implicated cases in this group (possibly including A's case)
would support an inference that the prosecutor would have sought, and the
jury would have imposed, a death sentence in A's case even if he had been
white. For this reason, a legislature might rationally conclude that under
such circumstances, the State should be able to overcome the presumption
of discrimination as it applies to the case of A if the State can establish by
objective evidence concerning similar cases that race was not a but-for factor
in A's case. Other, more demanding alternative defenses would allow the
State to prevail if it could show (a) that race did not play a substantial or
significant role or (b) that race played no role at all in A's sentence-in other
words, it was not a motivating factor.' 6 '
In cases outside the criminal law, causation-based models provide the
final line of defense against unrebutted statistically based claims. Usually,
the proponent of the causation-based defense must shoulder a heavy burden
161. The but-for model of proof is the most conservative model. It would be
considerably more difficult for the State to prove that race was not a substantial factor or
was not a factor at all.
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of proof, such as a requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
For example, in a class action claiming discrimination in employment
practices, current law allows plaintiffs to establish liability with statistical
evidence that shows a substantial, unrebutted race or gender effect among a
group of applicants. This proof moves the case to a remedial stage during
which the employer is given the opportunity to escape liability with respect
to the individual members of the protected class. This can be done by
persuading the court, on the basis of objective evidence concerning the
treatment of other applicants, that specific individuals simply were
unqualified and that race or gender was not a but-for cause of the employer's
decisions adversely affecting them.' 62
A defense of this type may be established with statistical or qualitative
evidence. It may be proven statistically by estimating the probability of an
outcome adverse to a person not in the protected class who is otherwise
comparable to the individual being scrutinized. For example, in a recent
mortgage lending discrimination case, a statistical analysis of lending
decisions showed substantial unrebutted evidence of discrimination against
black applicants, 72 of whom had been denied loans. 63 On the basis of
the statistical model that had established liability, it was possible to establish
that if the lender had evaluated those 72 black applicants using the same
standards used to evaluate white applicants, 25 (or 35 %) of the applications
filed by those black applicants would have been accepted."6 On the basis
of these results, the awards that ultimately resulted in this case were limited
162. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 (1977)
(citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,772 (1976)) (applying test in Title VII
employment discrimination case); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. -ous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (noting burden shift in Fourteenth Amendment zoning
discrimination claim); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
285-86 (1977) (applying test to employment discrimination claim arising in context of First
Amendment).
163. See Mortgage Lending Discrimination: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1993) (statement of James
P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division) (describing evidence
and settlement in pattern and practice action, United States v. Decatur Say. and Loan Ass'n
(unreported case), brought under Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988), and
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988)).
164. Id. Estimates such as those used in Decatur can be made with a model produced
through an analysis of all of the cases. It is also possible to use models estimated separately
for black and white applicants.
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to the 25 rejected black applicants with respect to whom the defendant lender
failed to carry its but-for burden of proof."s  However, the other 47
applicants received no relief because the statistical model indicated that their
loan applications would have been denied even if they had been white. Simi-
larly, in the death sentencing context, if a statistical model of prosecutorial
decision making were used, one could estimate, for example, the probability
that the prosecution would have sought a death sentence in a black-defendant
case if the defendant had been white. ' A similar analysis of decisions by
sentencing judges and juries could be conducted, as well as an analysis of the
combined effects of all decisions subsequent to indictment.167
Policymakers might consider several points in their assessment of the
pros and cons of risk-based, as contrasted with causation-based, models of
proof in the capital sentencing context. Depending upon the specific
showing required to overcome an unrebutted prima facie case, a causation-
based model will reduce, to varying degrees, the risk that a defendant will
be executed even though racial factors were present in his case. The but-for
test, which of the three tests previously discussed is the most forgiving to the
State, would uphold a defendant's death sentence even if race were a
substantial, but not a but-for, factor in the defendant's case. The substantial
factor test would allow a defendant to be executed as long as race was only
a minor factor in the case. The most stringent of the three tests would allow
a death sentence to stand only if the State showed that race played no part
whatsoever in the defendant's case.
It is apparent, therefore, that under the first two tests, defendants
whose death sentences were partly motivated by race could nevertheless be
executed. Indeed, given the complexity of the causal issue to be addressed,
165. Id.
166. In making this causal assessment, a court may usefully consider (a) other forms of
statistical evidence involving cases that are closely comparable to the case under review and
(b) qualitative comparative evidence consisting of narrative summaries of the cases most
comparable to that of the defendant. The court obviously would have the greatest confidence
when both the quantitative and qualitative results point in the same direction. Unless both
types of evidence support the State's case, the State would likely fail to carry its burden of
proof.
167. It is worth noting that in an analysis of Georgia's death sentencing system that was
similar though not identical to the analysis in Decatur, we estimated that among white-victim
cases that resulted in the death penalty between 1973 and 1979, the victim's race was a but-
for causal factor of the death sentence in 29% of the cases. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23,
at 155.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1994)
there is a risk that death sentences motivated in part by racial discrimination
will not be identified and that an execution will follow, even under the most
stringent "no motivating factor" test. By contrast, the risk-based models of
proof avoid such potential pitfalls. That is their virtue. Their vice,
however, is that they may allow some offenders to avoid execution even
though race played no, or only a minor, role in their sentences.' 68 Thus,
selection of the appropriate model of proof for capital sentencing cases is
guided on the one hand by one's concern about the execution of a death
sentence motivated by, but not necessarily caused by, race. That consider-
ation is balanced on the other hand against one's concern that a death
sentence will be vacated even though race was not a but-for factor in the
decision.
D. Quota Arguments Are Misleading
The argument that application of the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act
would require the use of quotas is extremely misleading. 69 Experience
outside the criminal law provides no support for this claim. Consider, for
example, racial discrimination in employment. Assume that the proportion
of minorities who applied to a given employer (for example, 50%) were
much higher than proportions of minorities who were hired (for example,
20%). The employer could vindicate its choices as the product of an even-
handed selection process by showing that the lower hiring rate for the
minorities reflected lower average qualification levels for the minority
applicants. Thus, if the system were evenhanded, the apparent initial
disparities would vanish after controlling for the different qualification levels
of all of the applicants. The employer would have no need for quotas-nor,
in the criminal context, would prosecutors, judges, or juries who processed
all capital cases in an evenhanded manner.
In the employment discrimination context, the United States Supreme
Court has for years authorized methods of proving purposeful discrimination
that are comparable to those contemplated by the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act. 70 Plaintiffs in such cases sometimes win and sometimes
lose, but no one has ever seriously claimed that either the right to challenge
classwide purposeful discrimination in an employment context or the
168. See supra text accompanying note 160.
169. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 150.
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methods of proof employed for the task have led to racial or gender quotas
in employment. The current dispute over quotas under the 1991 Civil Rights
Act relates strictly to so-called "disparate impact" claims (which require no
proof of purposeful discrimination) and not to claims of classwide "disparate
treatment" discrimination (which do require proof of intentional discrimina-
tion).1
71
In spite of the inherent flaws in the arguments against the proposed
Racial Justice Act and the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, intensive
171. The Supreme Court has distinguished between disparate treatment and disparate
impact discrimination as follows:
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred
from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.... Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparate impact theory.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citations
omitted).
In addition to de facto abolition and quota arguments, opponents of the Fairness in
Death Sentencing Act and the Racial Justice Act introduced a proposed "Equal Justice Act,"
which prohibits the use of "statistical tests" as a means "to achieve a specified racial
proportion" of offenders. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002, 137 CONG. REC. S8369
(daily ed. June 20, 1991) (Thurmond Amendment No. 367) [hereinafter Equal Justice Act];
see H.R. 2217, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 701-705 (1993). This provision reflects a complete
misconception of the function of statistical tests. Such tests are used to compare differences
in the rates at which characteristics of all types occur in different populations-for example,
the rates at which cancer develops in people who smoke as compared to those who do
not-and to provide a basis for making causal inferences. In the context of death sentencing
research, statistical tests, as contemplated by the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, are
merely an aid in determining whether different racial groups are being treated differently and
whether those differences are a product of chance, the uneven distribution of nonracial factors
among different racial groups, or racial discrimination. Those tests have nothing whatsoever
to do with achieving "a specified racial proportion relating to offenders." Equal Justice Act,
supra, § 1002(b)(3), 137 CONG. REc. S8369. While Congress may wish to outlaw quotas
in death sentencing, to equate quotas with statistical tests is absurd. Moreover, the enactment
of such a provision could unintentionally limit the capacity of state courts to monitor their
own capital sentencing systems to ensure that they suffer from no racial discrimination.
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1994)
lobbying by many prosecutors and attorneys general from states espousing
the death penalty has successfully persuaded the United States Senate to
reject the original Racial Justice Act on four separate occasions."u The
Fairness in Death Sentencing Act has been approved twice by the House of
Representatives, but each time it ultimately foundered in a Senate-House
conference committee." 7 Nevertheless, the fundamental capacity of such
172. On October 13, 1988, the Senate defeated the Racial Justice Act by a vote of 52
to 35 when it was introduced as an amendment to the Omnibus Drug Initiative Act of 1988.
136 CONG. REc. S6884 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Graham). In 1990,
during the Senate's consideration of the Omnibus Crime Bill, Senator Graham successfully
offered an amendment to strike the Racial Justice Act of 1989 from the Bill approved by the
Judiciary Committee. Id. The vote was 58 to 38 in favor of the amendment. Id. at 56910.
In 1991, during the Senate's consideration of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, Senator
Graham offered another amendment to strike the Racial Justice Act of 1991, which again had
been approved by the Judiciary Committee. 137 CONG. REC. S8282 (daily ed. June 20,
1991) (statement of Sen. Graham). The Senate adopted this amendment by a vote of 55 to
41. Id. at S8300. Finally, on May 11, 1994, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 58 to 41, a
nonbinding resolution instructing its conferees to insist on dropping the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act (referred to in the debate as the Racial Justice Act) from the pending Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. 140 CONG. REc. S5526 (daily ed. May 11, 1994). See
Appendix C for details of this legislative activity.
173. In 1990, during House consideration of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1990, Representative William Hughes from New Jersey introduced an amendment that
substituted the provision that came to be known as the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act for
the Racial Justice Act, which had been adopted by the Judiciary Committee as part of the
Crime Bill. 136 CONG. REc. H9001 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
The House adopted the amendment by a vote of 218 to 186. Id. at H9005. Representative
Sensenbrenner then introduced an amendment that would have struck the Racial Justice Act
from the Crime Bill. Id. The House rejected this amendment by a vote of 216 to 204. Id.
at H901 1. Thereafter, Senate and House conferees agreed to set aside the Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act and many other highly contested provisions of the Omnibus Crime Bill. Id.
at H13,296 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
On April 20, 1994, the House, by a vote of 217 to 212, rejected an attempt to strike
from the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 a measure entitled
Racially Discriminatory Capital Sentencing (Title IX), which with one minor addition is
identical to the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act passed in 1990. 140 CONG. REC. H2533
(daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994). On April 21, 1994, the House rejected an attempt to replace Title
IX with a competing measure, Representative Bill McCollum's Equal Justice Act. Id. at
H2608 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1994). The Equal Justice Act is described supra at note 171. In
1994, a Senate-House conference committee deliberated for more than two months before
rejecting the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act from the crime bill. See Appendix C for
details of this legislative activity.
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legislative proposals to diminish, if not eliminate, the impact of racial factors
in capital cases remains essentially unimpeached.
V. The New Jersey Experiment
Post-McCleskey capital sentencing developments in the New Jersey
Supreme Court are significant for two reasons. First, they provide the
opportunity to test the feasibility of the models for proving discrimination
that we have discussed-both structurally and in individual cases. Second,
the New Jersey experience promises to shed new light on the plausibility of
both the inevitability and impossibility hypotheses.'74 Specifically, the
results of the New Jersey experiment may provide reliable evidence bearing
on the following questions:
" Is racial discrimination in death sentencing inevitable, or can legal
procedures be adopted (by legislators, prosecutors, or courts) to
prevent it?
" Can such racial discrimination be validly detected (a) in subgroups
of cases within the system and (b) in individual cases?
" Can racial discrimination be corrected in subgroups of cases and
in individual cases without the de facto abolition of capital punish-
ment or the use of quotas?
In 1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court commenced the development
of a dual-purpose data base, which embraces all death-eligible cases
processed through its death sentencing system since 1982. We helped the
court develop this resource over a three-year period. 75 Its primary
function is to provide detailed information on death-eligible cases for use in
the comparative proportionality review of death sentences. These same data
also enable the court to monitor its death sentencing system for evidence of
racial discrimination and to provide defendants and the State with a basis for
asserting and defending claims of discrimination.
174. Recent developments in New Jersey are consistent with the American tradition of
using states as laboratories for testing and experimenting with new legal approaches.
175. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1063 (N.J. 1992). Professor Baldus was
appointed Special Master for Proportionality Review to assist the court. Id. Professor
Woodworth and Mr. Pulaski served as consultants for the project.
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State v. Marshall76 was the first case in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered detailed evidence of racial discrimination in its
capital punishment system. In Marshall, the New Jersey court rejected the
McCleskey approach and ruled that under the equal protection clause of the
New Jersey Constitution,"7 claims of race-of-victim and race-of-defendant
discrimination are cognizable. 7 It also recognized the standing of a white
defendant to present a "structural challenge to the constitutional fairness" of
New Jersey's death sentencing system as that system is actually applied by
the state's prosecutors and juries.1 79 The operative test asks whether the
race of the victim or the race of the defendant "played a significant part in
capital-sentencing decisions in New Jersey.""s The focus in the Marshall
case was on the constitutional legitimacy of the system as a whole, rather
than on the risk that race might have adversely influenced the decision of the
prosecutor or jury in an individual case.
The Marshall opinion is less developed regarding potential remedies
because the New Jersey court did not find evidence of unconstitutional
discrimination. The court did state that if it found such discrimination to
exist, it would "seek corrective measures," whose impact the court could
observe through its system of judicial oversight.' The most likely
possibilities would be a limitation on the class of death-eligible cases or the
promulgation of more objective and detailed standards to guide the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. The court further stated that if the corrective
measures failed to correct the discrimination, it "could not ... tolerate"
such a system and would presumably declare it unconstitutional."
176. 613 A.2d 1059 (N.J. 1992).
177. N.J. CoNsT. art. I, 1.
178. State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1109 (N.J. 1992). "New Jersey's history and
traditions would never countenance racial disparity in capital sentencing. As a people, we
are uniquely committed to the elimination of racial discrimination." Id. at 1108. The court
specifically rejected the McCleskey "parade of horribles," which suggested that a ruling in
favor of McCleskey would open the courts to an unmanageable series of Eighth Amendment
claims throughout the criminal justice system. Id. at 1110; see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 317-18 (1987).
179. Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1109.
180. d. at 1110.
181. Id.
182. Id. As noted, the focus of Marshall was a "structural challenge" to the system as
a whole. The opinion did not, however, foreclose the possibility of recognizing a claim that
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The Marshall court considered certain evidence of discrimination that
we had developed during our study of New Jersey death sentences." The
data base for the project included 237 death-eligible cases processed in New
Jersey between 1982 and 1991, 39 of which resulted in death sentences."
The analysis that we presented to the court allows us to compare
evidence of racial discrimination in New Jersey from 1982 to 1991 with the
1973-79 results from Georgia that we presented in McCleskey." Table
3 presents the race-of-victim and race-of-defendant results in three parts,
each of which focuses on a different outcome. Part I of Table 3 presents
disparities in death sentencing rates imposed among all death-eligible cases.
These race effects reflect the combined effects of all decisions, from the
point of indictment to the final sentencing decision. Part II of Table 3
presents disparities in the rates at which death-eligible cases advance to a
penalty trial, an outcome primarily determined by the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion. Part III of Table 3 presents disparities in jury penalty-
trial sentencing decisions.
an individual death sentence should be vacated on the ground that it was racially motivated.
In Part IV of this Article, we discuss alternative models for proving and defending claims of
discrimination in individual cases. See supra notes 128-73 and accompanying text. In Part
VI, we describe a risk-based model developed by former Chief Justice Barkett of the Florida
Supreme Court that parallels the approach of Justice Blackmun's dissent in McCleskey. See
infra notes 197-216 and accompanying text.
183. See Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1073.
184. Id. at 1073, 1089.
185. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987).
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Table 3
Evidence of Racial Discrimination in Capital Sentencing:




I. Death Sentence Imposed
Among Death-Eligible
Cases
A. Georgia (n = 2342) 4.3 (.003) .94 (.88)
B. New Jersey (n = 237)C 2.4 (.50) 3.6 (.36)
II. Advancement of Cases to a
Penalty Trial
A. Georgia (n = 708)d 3.3 (.02) 2.4 (.10)
B. New Jersey (n = 237)' 3.3 (.008) 0.73 (.40)
III. Jury Death Sentencing
Decision
A. Georgia (n = 253)f 3.4 (.02) 1.3 (.50)
B. New Jersey (n = 123)1 2.9 (.27) 18.6 (.01)
The reported statistics are odds multipliers with the level of statistical significance in
parentheses.
b BALDUS Er AL., supra note 23, at 319-320.
c DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT: FINAL REPORT
TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, technical app. 10, sched. 11 (Sept. 24, 1991) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
d BALDUS Er AL., supra note 23, app. L, sched. 8.
1 BALDUS, supra note c, technical app. 10, sched. 14.
tBALDUS Er AL., supra note 23, app. L, sched. 9.
9 BALDUS, supra note c, technical app. 10, sched. 5.
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The statistics reported in Table 3 are "odds multipliers." They
indicate, on average, the extent to which the odds of receiving a death
sentence or advancing to a penalty trial are enhanced if the victim is white
or the defendant is black. Each of these disparities is calculated after
adjusting for the most important and statistically significant legitimate case
characteristics, such as the commission of a contemporaneous armed robbery
or the killing of a police officer."8 The key statistic from McCleskey was
the odds multiplier of 4.3 (with strong statistical significance) reported in
Row IA, Column B. It shows that after adjusting for 39 background
variables affecting the aggravation levels of the cases, the odds of receiving
a death sentence are, on average, 4.3 times higher if the case involves a
white victim. " In New Jersey, by contrast, the equivalent coefficient is 2.4
(Row IB, Column D), which is considerably smaller and lacks statistical
significance. The race-of-defendant disparities in Column C show a curious
result-black defendants in New Jersey are, on average, at greater risk of
receiving a death sentence (3.6) than they are in Georgia (.94). However,
neither of these disparities is statistically significant, which, for New Jersey,
may possibly be explained by the comparatively smaller sample of cas-
es. 1
8 8
A comparison of the results in Parts II and III of Table 3 provides
further insight into the disparities reported in Part I. With respect to the
race-of-victim disparities set forth in Column B, the Georgia results show
statistically significant disparities both for prosecutors (3.3-Row HA) and
for juries (3.4-Row IIIA), which help to explain the strong and highly
significant overall disparity in Row IA (4.3). In New Jersey, there is a
substantial race-of-victim disparity both for prosecutors (3.3-Row IIB) and
juries (2.9-Row IIIB). However, the jury disparity is not a statistically
significant factor, which may explain the overall lack of statistical signifi-
cance noted in Row IB.
Column C, which focuses on race-of-defendant disparities, shows quite
different results for Georgia and New Jersey. In Georgia, the race-of-
defendant effect is weak for prosecutors (2.4-Row IIA) and very weak for
186. In the Georgia analyses, the number of such variables ranges from 10 to 39, while
in the New Jersey analyses, the number ranges from 23 to 30.
187. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
188. The level of statistical significance of a disparity in the death sentencing context
depends primarily on the size of the disparity and the number of cases (sample size) involved
in the analysis.
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juries (1.3-Row IIIA). In New Jersey (Row IIB), we also see no race-of-
defendant effect in the prosecutorial decisions (in fact, white defendants are
at a slightly greater risk of advancing to a penalty trial). However, Row IIIB
reveals a strong, statistically significant race-of-defendant effect in jury
sentencing decisions (18.6). However, when this disparity is combined with
the absence of prosecutorial race-of-defendant effects, the overall statewide
disparity shown in Row IB (3,6) is much lower and is not statistically
significant.
As was the case in our Georgia study, the New Jersey data also show
a concentration of race effects in the mid-range of cases in which the ability
to exercise discretion is the greatest. 89 For example, Table 4 sorts New
Jersey penalty-trial decisions into five levels of culpability from lowest (1)
to highest (5). Columns B and C report the death sentencing rates for black
and "other" (white and Hispanic) defendants, and Column D reports the
disparity in percentage points. There is no race effect in levels 1, 2, and 5.
But among the 50 cases in levels 3 and 4, there is a very large race-of-
defendant disparity, which is the source of the large race-of-defendant
disparity reported in Table 3, Row IIIB, Column C. When the disparity in
levels 3 and 4 is averaged with the zero effects in levels 1, 3, and 5, the
overall average race-of-defendant disparity is 19 percentage points. If a
court were convinced of the validity of such data, it might consider relief of
the type suggested by Justices Stevens and Blackmun in McCleskey: limiting
death sentencing strictly to the "most aggravated" category, in which there
are no race effects.'90
189. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at287 n.5 (noting concentration of race effects in mid-
range Georgia cases).
190. See id. at 365 (Blackmun, ., dissenting); id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Table 4
Race-of-Defendant Disparities in New Jersey Penalty-Trial
Death Sentencing Decisions After Adjustment for Case
Culpability Levels: 1983-91a
A DCulpability Penalty-Trial Death Sentencing Rates Dispaty in
Level Percentage
(1) Low to B C Pointsb
(5) High Black Defendants Other Defendants (B-C)
1 .0 (0/13) .0 (0/10) 0
2 .0(0/13) .0(0/12) 0
3 .30(3/10) .0(0/15) 30
4 .87 (7/8) .23 (4/17) 64
5 1.0(11/11) 1.0(14/14) 0
Average .38 (21/55) .26 (18/68)
1 DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT: FINAL REPORT
TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, tbl. 18 (Sept. 24, 1991) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
b The overall average race-of-defendant disparity is 19 percentage points, statistically
significant at the .0001 level. The overall disparity equals the sum, for each culpability level, of the
disparity in Column D times the number of cases at each of the five levels on the culpability scale
divided by the total sample size-i.e., 23.5/123 = .19. The levels of statistical significance were
calculated in a Mantel-Haenszel procedure.
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Table 5 reports the race-of-victim disparity for the New Jersey cases
that advance to a penalty trial. It shows less dramatic mid-range effects than
Table 4. Nevertheless, the disparity at level 3 (47 percentage points) is at
least 2 times larger than any of the other statistical disparities. Depending
on how the cases are classified, the overall estimated average race-of-victim
disparity is from 14 to 17 percentage points.
Table 5
Race-of-Victim Disparities in Rates at Which New Jersey
Cases Advance to a Penalty Trial After Adjustment for
Case Culpability Levels: 1983-91'
A Rates at Which Cases Advance to a D
Culpability Penalty Trial Disparity in
Level Percentage
(1) Low to B C PointsO
(5) High White-Victim Cases Other Cases (B-C)
1 .17(4/24) .04(2/45) 13
2 .50 (8/16) .33 (5/15) 17
3 .67(10/15) .20(3/15) 47
4 .78 (14/18) .56 (10/18) 22
5 .97 (34/35) .92 (33/36) 5
Average .65 (70/108) .41 (53/129)
DAVID C. BALDUS, DEATH PENALTY PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT: FINAL REPORT
TOTHENEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT, tbl. 18A (Sept. 24, 1991) (on file with Washington andLee Law
Review).
The overall average race-of-victim disparity is at least 14 percentage points. The overall
disparity is the sum, for each culpability level, of the disparity in Column D times the number of cases
at each of the five levels on the culpability scale divided by the total sample size. The overall disparity
on the 5-level scale in this table was 17 percentage points (39.73/237), p = .001. On a 10-level scale,
the overall disparity was 14 percentage points (33.11/237), p = .004. The levels of statistical
significance were calculated in a Mantel-Haenszel procedure.
The New Jersey court in Marshall expressed concern about the
evidence of discrimination in its capital sentencing system, especially injury
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN DEATH SENTENCING
sentencing decisions." It concluded, however, that the data were less
strong than the evidence presented in McCleskey and did not establish a
constitutional violation."9 In terms of the overall race-of-victim effects
shown in Table 3, Row IB, Column D, this conclusion seems correct
because the disparity is smaller than the McCleskey disparity and is not
statistically significant. As for the race-of-defendant effects in the jury
penalty-trial data, the court was cautious because changes in the law that
would be likely to reduce discrimination had occurred in 1987 and 1988 and
because there were an inadequate number of post-1988 cases with which to
estimate race-of-defendant effects. 93
There was stronger evidence of race effects in prosecutorial decision
making.)" Nevertheless, the practical effect of these prosecutorial
decisions has been ameliorated by the fact that according to the records of
the Administrative Office of the New Jersey Courts, over 80 % of all of New
Jersey's death sentences imposed since 1982 have been vacated because of
legal errors unrelated to racial issues. The data are disturbing nonetheless.
To meet those concerns, the New Jersey court in Marshall urged the state's
Attorney General and prosecutors to cooperate with the court and its staff in
maintaining and improving the court's data base in order to enhance its
capacity to detect signs of discrimination in the system.' 95 The court also
suggested that its "unease" about racial issues would be ameliorated "if there
were some type of inter-agency review to provide the most rudimentary
monitoring of the [prosecutorial] capital-charging decisions."'"
VT The Barkett Prosecutorial Discretion Model
Another response to McCleskey has recently emerged from the Florida
Supreme Court."9 Because only three of the court's seven members
support this approach, it is still only a proposal. If adopted and applied by
191. Marshall, 613 A.2d at 1112.
192. Id. at 1110.
193. Id. at 1112.
194. See id. at 1110-11.
195. Id. at 1114.
196. Id.
197. See Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455,465-68 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 398 (1993).
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the court, it could shed important light on both the inevitability and
impossibility hypotheses.
Former Chief Justice Barkett presented the proposal in a dissenting
opinion in Foster v. State.9' She began by rejecting McCleskey as
inconsistent with the Florida Constitution: "Discrimination, whether
conscious or unconscious, cannot be permitted in Florida courts. As
important as it is to ensure a jury selection process free from racial
discrimination, it is infinitely more important to ensure that the State is not
imposing the ultimate penalty of death in a racially discriminatory man-
ner."f199  This echoes the position of the New Jersey court."°°  The
Barkett alternative for detecting and curing the effects of discrimination,
however, is narrower than the New Jersey approach. Although obviously
inspired by Justice Blackmun's concern with decisions affecting an individual
case, the Barkett model of proof does not focus on the death sentencing
decisions themselves. Rather, it examines the charging and plea bargaining
decisions of a given prosecutor's office, especially that office's decisions to
seek the death sentence."°
The Barkett approach builds primarily on models of proof developed
in the Florida courts to scrutinize the prosecutorial use of peremptory
challenges in jury selection.2' This model of proof, like the one applied
by Justice Blackmun in his McCleskey dissent, is risk-based and does not
require proof that the specific decision under challenge was racially
motivated. Instead, it depends upon proof that relevant decision-making
"practices" in the prosecutor's office were influenced by racial consider-
ations.203 A prima facie case is established if an evaluation of the "capital
sentencing process... as a whole" indicates that "discrimination exists and
that there is a strong likelihood it has influenced the State to seek the death
198. 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992). In April 1994, Chief Justice Barkett was appointed
to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
199. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 466 (Fla. 1992) (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 398 (1993).
200. See State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1108-09 (N.J. 1992).
201. See Foster, 614 So. 2d at 467 (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
202. See State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 21-22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219
(1988).
203. Foster, 614 So. 2d at 467-68 (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The suspect categories under the Barkett approach are both the race of the victim and the race
of the defendant. Id. at 468.
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penalty."24 This showing would shift to the State the burden of demon-
strating that the "practices in question are not racially motivated."2 If the
State fails to meet this burden, it would be "prohibited from seeking the
death penalty in that case. "I
When proceeding under the Barkett approach, a claimant would be
able to establish a violation with either statistical or qualitative evidence.
This evidence might include not only a quantitative analysis of "the disposi-
tion of first-degree murder cases in a particular jurisdiction, but also other
information that could suggest discrimination. "' This "other information"
category apparently could include evidence of the prosecutorial "resources
devoted to the prosecution" of white-victim cases as compared to black-
victim cases and evidence of the "general conduct" of the state attorney's
office, which could include "hiring practices and the use of racial epithets
and jokes.' "8 "[AII aspects" of the prosecutor's policies "should be avail-
able for evaluation by a court in reviewing evidence of discrimination. "I
In Foster, the "raw numbers" for the period 1975 to 1987 showed that
in the state attorney's office under scrutiny:
" defendants in white-victim cases were four times as likely to be
charged with first-degree murder as defendants in black-victim
cases,
" defendants with white victims charged with first-degree murder
were six times more likely to go to trial than defendants with black
victims, and
" of those tried for first-degree murder, defendants with white
victims were 26 times more likely to be convicted than defendants
with black victims .2,0
Although the issue in Foster was limited to whether there should have been
a hearing on the discrimination issue, the implication of former Chief Justice
Barkett's dissenting opinion is that such data might be sufficient to establish
204. Id. at 467-68.
205. Id. at 468.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 467.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 463 (per curiam).
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a prima facie case of discrimination in a prosecutorial decision to seek a
death sentence.2 '
The Barkett model of proof has a number of strengths. First, it does
not place on defendants an unreasonable burden of proof in proving
discrimination. Instead, it proposes a burden-shifting approach used by
antidiscrimination laws in many other contexts.212 Second, it grants broad
discretion to the trial court to consider all forms of relevant evidence, both
quantitative and qualitative." 3 Over time, the. application of this standard
also would lead to the development of general rules of thumb like those used
in the evaluation of evidence of discrimination in other contexts.214 Third,
211. We speculate on the application of the Barkett model to the facts in Fosterbecause
the sample sizes on which the disparities are based were not reported in the court's opinion.
It is also likely that the application of the Barkett model would have supported a prima facie
case in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). There, the weighted sample of cases
from Fulton County consisted of 581 defendants indicted for murder, 10 of whom received
in a death sentence. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 337. Table I shows the outcomes
for the white- and black-victim cases at each stage of the Fulton County death penalty
process. See supra note 29. At each step, the white-victim defendants were treated more
punitively. Table 2 also shows the actual death sentencing disparities among the 32 most
aggravated Fulton County cases (which include all 10 of the county's death sentences),
stratified by their level of aggravation. See supra note 29. The average overall race-of-
victim disparity is 28 percentage points and in the category of "Typical" cases (Row IIB in
Table 2) in which McCleskey's case falls, the disparity is 40 percentage points. In fact, no
death sentences were imposed in the three black-victim cases at this level of culpability.
McCleskey also offered qualitative evidence that would be relevant under the Foster
standard. The first was the deposition of the Fulton County district attorney, who had served
in that office for eighteen years. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 357 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He testified that there were no standards for assistant district attorneys regarding plea
bargaining in death-eligible cases or guiding them as to when to seek the death penalty. Id.
He also testified that neither he nor his deputies provided systematic oversight of his office's
daily decisions in death-eligible cases. Id. at 357-58. McCleskey's second item of qualitative
evidence was testimony that his jury had included only one black juror. See BALDUS E" AL.,
supra note 23, at 340. Under the Barkett test, it seems quite likely that McCleskey would
have established a prima facie case, and in the absence of rebuttal by the State, his death
sentence would have been vacated.
212. See Foster, 614 So. 2d at468 (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 467; see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 387 (1986) (per curiam)
(holding "that, on remand, the Court of Appeals should examine all of the evidence in the
record relating to salary disparities under the clearly-erroneous standard").
214. Chief Justice Barkett specifically rejects the search for a single "bright line test."
Foster, 614 So. 2d at 467 (Barkett, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the Barkett approach would create incentives for prosecutors to maintain data
on all death-eligible cases in accessible form for use in rebutting a prima
facie case of discrimination. To be effective, these records would also
include the reasons for seeking or not seeking a death sentence in each death-
eligible case. Additionally, with richer data available on the operation of
their offices, prosecutors would be in a better position to monitor the racial
consequences of their own decisions and to eliminate the conscious or uncon-
scious influence of any racial considerations in their decision making.
Fourth, the Barkett approach contemplates pretrial challenges to
decisions to seek a death sentence.215 If successful, this approach would
avoid the expense of a capital trial and the multiple postconviction proceed-
ings that often result when a death sentence is imposed. Fifth, because the
Barkett approach appears to scrutinize only prosecutorial decisions, the
target of the claims will be in a position, unlike a jury, to explain their
decisions, as they currently do in defending challenges to their use of
peremptories. 21' A final advantage of the Barkett model of proof is that
it can be applied without the need for a large and expensive data base of the
type developed for the McCleskey case and, more recently, by the New
Jersey court.
VIL Conclusion
Claims that racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty is inevitable and that such discrimination is impossible to prevent,
detect, and correct enable judges and legislators to avoid difficult choices.
Whether such claims are honestly asserted or whether they are only
subterfuges for other, unspoken goals, they do not comport with the
available quantitative and anecdotal data. Although there is considerable
evidence that racial discrimination does infect the death sentencing process,
there is very little evidence suggesting that such discrimination cannot be
prevented. In the early 1970s, in the wake of Furman v. Georgia, many
states adopted sentencing reforms intended to achieve this result. It is now
apparent that those early reforms were less than successful. However, with
hindsight, it is also possible to identify with considerable success the reasons
215. See id. at 468.
216. In states like Florida, where trial judges are the final sentencing authority, the
Barkett model also could be used in postconviction proceedings to challenge judicial death
sentencing decisions.
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why those reforms failed and how improved procedures might very likely
succeed.
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, there have been no serious judicial or
legislative efforts to achieve the results to which the post-Furnan legislation
aspired. Nor have the state or federal courts made any sustained effort to
confront the issue of racial discrimination in individual capital cases.
Indeed, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the United States Supreme Court put the
entire subject off-limits for federal courts. Almost all of the state courts
have also followed McCleskey, although that decision in no way limited their
ability to address discriminatory capital sentencing as a matter of state law.
More troubling, however, is the failure of Congress to address this issue,
especially because the McCleskey opinion specifically invited legislative
intervention.217
Apologists for this pattern of judicial and legislative inaction frequently
assert that permitting capital defendants to challenge the racially infected
character of their death sentences would result in either the de facto abolition
of the death penalty or the use of quotas. The evidence relating to both of
these claims is unpersuasive. Recent judicial pronouncements by the New
Jersey Supreme Court and by three Florida Supreme Court Justices, as well
as the extensive experience of state and federal courts in adjudicating
discrimination claims in employment and other contexts outside the criminal
law, strongly suggest that procedures are available for identifying racially
affected death sentences without unduly interfering with the entire capital
sentencing process. Furthermore, whether such procedures employ a risk-
based model of proof, which focuses upon quantitative indicia of purposeful
discrimination by examining groups of similar cases, or employ a causation-
based model, similar to those that courts sometimes employ in contexts
outside the criminal law, legislators and judges can modulate the frequency
with which such procedures are likely to overprotect or underprotect death-
217. Justice Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey suggested that "McCleskey's
arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
319 (1987). In his view, state legislatures are better able to respond to the will and the moral
values of the people. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)). They are also, he said, better able to evaluate statistical studies in terms
of their own local conditions. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
The only move in this direction at the state level of which we are aware is the recent
introduction in the Maryland legislature of a bill modeled after the proposed Fairness in Death
Sentencing Act. See S. 440, 408th Sess. (Md. 1994).
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sentenced defendants in cases in which the impact of racial factors may be
problematic.
Obviously, the precise level of protection that such defendants should
receive is a matter to be determined by each jurisdiction that addresses the
issue and may well depend upon the perceived risk of surreptitious
discrimination based upon historical factors. What we wish to emphasize,
however, is that the tools are available to prevent racially motivated death
sentences. What some may describe as the inevitability of such sentences or
the impossibility of preventing, detecting, and correcting them reflects, in
our judgment, only an unwillingness to make the effort.
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"For purposes of this chapter-
"(1) the term 'a racially discriminatory pattern' means a situation in
which sentences of death are imposed more frequently-
"(A) upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or
"(B) as punishment for crimes against persons of one race than as
punishment for crimes against persons of another race,
and the greater frequency is not explained by pertinent nonracial circum-
stances;
"(2) the term 'death-eligible crime' means a crime for which death is a
punishment that is authorized by law to be imposed under any circumstances
upon a conviction of that crime;
"(3) the term 'case of death-eligible crime' means a case in which the
complaint, indictment, information, or any other initial or subsequent
charging paper charges any person with a death-eligible crime; and
"(4) the term 'Federal or State entity' means any State, the District of
Columbia, the United States, any territory thereof, and any subdivision or
authority of any of these entities that is empowered to provide by law that
death be imposed as punishment for crime.
"2922. Prohibition on the imposition or execution of the death penalty
in a racially discriminatory pattern
"(a) PROHIBITION.-It is unlawful to impose or execute sentences of
death under color of State or Federal law in a racially discriminatory pattern.
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No person shall be put to death in the execution of a sentence imposed
pursuant to any law if that person's death sentence furthers a racially
discriminatory pattern.
"(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PArTERN.-To establish that a racially
discriminatory pattern exists for purposes of this chapter-
"(1) ordinary methods of statistical proof shall suffice; and
"(2) it shall not be necessary to show discriminatory motive, intent,
or purpose on the part of any individual or institution.
"(c) PRIMA FACIE SHOWING.-(1) To establish a prima facie showing of
a racially discriminatory pattern for purposes of this chapter, it shall suffice
that death sentences are being imposed or executed-
"(A) upon persons of one race with a frequency that is dispropor-
tionate to their representation among the numbers of persons arrested
for, charged with, or convicted of, death-eligible crimes; or
"(B) as punishment for crimes against persons of one race with a
frequency that is disproportionate to their representation among persons
against whom death-eligible crimes have been committed.
"(2) To rebut a prima facie showing of a racially discriminatory pattern,
a State or Federal entity must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
identifiable and pertinent nonracial factors persuasively explain the
observable racial disparities comprising the pattern.
"2923. Data on death penalty cases
"(a) DESIGNATION OF AGENCY.-Any State or Federal entity that
provides by law for death to be imposed as a punishment for any crime shall
designate a central agency to collect and maintain pertinent data on the
charging, disposition, and sentencing patterns for all cases of death-eligible
crimes.
"(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF CENTRAL AGENCY.-Each central agency
designated pursuant to subsection (a) shall-
"(1) affirmatively monitor compliance with this chapter by local
officials and agencies;
"(2) devise and distribute to every local official or agency responsible
for the investigation or prosecution of death-eligible crimes a standard
form to collect pertinent data;
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"(3) maintain all standard forms, compile and index all information
contained in the forms, and make both the forms and the compiled
information publicly available;
"(4) maintain a centralized, alphabetically indexed file of all police
and investigative reports transmitted to it by local officials or agencies
in every case of death-eligible crime; and
"(5) allow access to its file of police and investigative reports to the
counsel of record for any person charged with any death-eligible crime
or sentenced to death who has made or intends to make a claim under
section 2922 and it may also allow access to this file to other persons.
"(c) RESPONSIBILITY OF LOCAL OFFICIAL.-(l) Each local official
responsible for the investigation or prosecution of death-eligible crimes
shall-
"(A) complete the standard form developed pursuant to subsection
(b)(2) on every case of death-eligible crime; and
"(B) transmit the standard form to the central agency no later than 3
months after the disposition of each such case whether that disposition is
by dismissal of charges, reduction of charges, acceptance of a plea of
guilty to the death-eligible crime or to another crime, acquittal,
conviction, or any decision not to proceed with prosecution.
"(2) In addition to the standard form, the local official or agency shall
transmit to the central agency one copy of all police and investigative reports
made in connection with each case of death-eligible crime.
"(d) PERTINENT DATA.-The pertinent data required in the standard form
shall be designated by the central agency but shall include, at a minimum,
the following information:
"(1) Pertinent demographic information on all persons charged with
the crime and all victims (including race, sex, age, and national origin).
"(2) Information on the principal features of the crime.
"(3) Information on the aggravating and mitigating factors of the
crime, including the background and character of every person charged
with the crime.
"(4) A narrative summary of the crime.
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"2924. Enforcement of the chapter
"(a) ACTION UNDER SECTIONS 2241, 2254, OR 2255 OF THIS TITLE.-
In any action brought in a court of the United States within the jurisdiction
conferred by sections 2241, 2254, or 2255, in which any person raises a
claim under section 2922-
"(1) the court shall appoint counsel for any such person who is
financially unable to retain counsel; and
"(2) the court shall furnish investigative, expert or other services
necessary for the adequate development of the claim to any such person
who is financially unable to obtain such services.
"(b) DETERMINATION BY A STATE COURT.-Notwithstanding section
2254, no determination on the merits of a factual issue made by a State court
pertinent to any claim under section 2922 shall be presumed to be correct
unless-
"(1) the State is in compliance with section 2923;
"(2) the determination was made in a proceeding in a State court in
which the person asserting the claim was afforded rights to the appoint-
ment of counsel and to the furnishing of investigative, expert and other
services necessary for the adequate development of the claim which were
substantially equivalent to those provided by subsection (a); and
"(3) the determination is one which is otherwise entitled to be
presumed to be correct under the criteria specified in section 2254."
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"§ 2921. Prohibition against the execution of a sentence of death
imposed on the basis of race
"(a) IN GENERAL.-No person shall be put to death under color of State
or Federal law in the execution of a sentence that was imposed based on
race.
"(b) INFERENCE OF RACE AS THE BASIS OF DEATH SENTENCE.-An
inference that race was the basis of a death sentence is established if valid
evidence is presented demonstrating that, at the time the death sentence was
imposed, race was a statistically significant factor in decisions to seek or to
impose the sentence of death in the jurisdiction in question.
"(c) RELEVANT EVIDENCE.-Evidence relevant to establish an inference
that race was the basis of a death sentence may include evidence that death
sentences were, at the time pertinent under subsection (b), being imposed
significantly more frequently in the jurisdiction in question-
"(1) upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or
"(2) as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race
than as punishment for capital offenses against persons of another race.
"(d) VALIDITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH AN INFER-
ENCE.-If statistical evidence is presented to establish an inference that race
was the basis of a sentence of death, the court shall determine the validity of
the evidence and if it provides a basis for the inference. Such evidence must
take into account, to the extent it is compiled and publicly made available,
evidence of the statutory aggravating factors of the crimes involved, and
shall include comparisons of similar cases involving persons of different
races.
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"(e) REBUTTAL.-If an inference that race was the basis of a death
sentence is established under subsection (b), the death sentence may not be
carried out unless the government rebuts the inference by a preponderance
of the evidence. Unless it can show that the death penalty was sought in all
cases fitting the statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty, the
government cannot rely on mere assertions that it did not intend to
discriminate or that the cases in which death was imposed fit the statutory
criteria for imposition of the death penalty.
§ 2922. Access to data on death eligible cases
"Data collected by public officials concerning factors relevant to the
imposition of the death sentence shall be made publicly available.
§ 2923. Enforcement of the chapter
"In any proceeding brought under section 2254, the evidence supporting
a claim under this chapter may be presented in an evidentiary hearing and
need not be set forth in the petition. Notwithstanding section 2254, no
determination on the merits of a factual issue made by a State court pertinent
to any claim under section 2921 shall be presumed to be correct unless-
"(1) the State is in compliance with section 2922;
"(2) the determination was made in a proceeding in a State court in
which the person asserting the claim was afforded rights to the appoint-
ment of counsel and to the furnishing of investigative, expert and other
services necessary for the adequate development of the claim; and
"(3) the determination is one which is otherwise entitled to be
presumed to be correct under the criteria specified in section 2254."
425
51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359 (1994)
Appendix C
HISTORY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY
Since 1988, the House and Senate have considered two measures, the
Racial Justice Act and the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act. The following
is a listing of the various bills incorporating these measures and a brief
legislative chronology of each. All citations to the CongressionalRecord are
to the daily edition. Except for a modification in how the government may
rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of race discrimination, the measure before
the 103d Congress, Title IX, Racially Discriminatory Capital Sentencing, is
substantially the same measure as the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act.
103D CONGRESS (Jan. 1993 - Dec. 1994)
First Session
H.R. 3315: Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Reform Act.
Title VI, Subtitle A: Racial Justice Act.
Status: Pending.
Chronology: 10/19/93 Introduced, 139 CONG. REc. H8202.
H.R. 3329: Racial Justice Act of 1993.
Status: Pending.
Chronology: 10/21/93 Introduced, 139 CONG. REc. H8362.
Second Session
H.R. 4017: Racial Justice Act.
Status: Pending.
Chronology: 3/11/94 Introduced, 140 CONG. REc. H1322.
H.R. 4092: Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
Title IX: Racially Discriminatory Capital Sentencing.
Status: Became part of H.R. 3355, Amendments to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which is
pending.
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN DEATH SENTENCING
Chronology: 3/18/94 Introduced in the House following approval
by the Judiciary Committee, 140 CONG. REC.
H1556.
4/20/94 The House rejected, 216-212 (Roll No. 131),
an attempt to strike portions of Title IX from
the bill. Id. at H2533.
4/21/94 The House rejected, 235-192 (Roll No. 143),
an attempt to replace Title IX with a com-
peting measure, the Equal Justice Act. Id. at
H2607-08.
4/21/94 H.R. 4092 passed by the House, 285-141
(Roll No. 144). Id. at H2608.
4/21/94 The House, by voice vote, inserted H.R.
4092 into H.R. 3355. Id. at H2609.
5/11/94 The Senate adopted 58-41 (Vote No. 106), a
nonbinding resolution instructing its conferees
to insist on dropping Title IX from the bill.
Id. at S5526.
7/27/94 Title IX deleted from the bill by a Senate-
House conference committee.
102D CONGRESS (Jan. 1991 - Dec. 1992)
First Session
S. 1249: Racial Justice Act of 1991.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 6/6/91 Introduced, 137 CONG. Rac. S7291.
H.R. 2851: Fairness in Death Sentencing Act of 1991.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 7/10/91 Introduced, 137 CONG. REC. H5340.
7/31/91 Approved by the House Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights for full com-
mittee action. Id. at D1026.
S. 618: Violent Crime Control Act of 1991.
Title II, sec. 207: Racial Justice Act of 1991.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 3/12/91 Introduced, 137 CONG. REC. S3020.
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S. 1241: Violent Crime Control Act. Included Racial Justice Act.
Status: The Senate passed the bill after striking the Racial Justice
Act. Not enacted.
Chronology: 6/06/91 Introduced, 137 CONG. REc. S7321.
6/20/91 The Senate voted 55-41 (Vote No. 102) to
strike the Racial Justice Act from the bill. Id.
at S8300.
7/11/91 The Senate passed the bill, 71-26 (Vote No.
125), by voice vote. Id. at S9832.
H.R. 3371: Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1991.
Title XVI: Fairness in Death Sentencing Act of 1991.
Status: Passed by the House without the Fairness in Death Sen-
tencing Act. Not enacted.
Chronology: 9/23/91 Introduced, 137 CONG. REc. H6720.
9/24/91 The House Judiciary Committee rejected, 21-
12 (Committee Vote No. 222), a substitute
amendment for the Fairness in Death Sentenc-
ing Act. Bill Tracking Report, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT102 file.
10/22/91 The House voted 223-191 (Roll No. 322) to
strike the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act.
137 CONG. REc. at H8145-46.
10/22/91 The House passed the bill, 305-118 (Roll No.
327). Id. at H8173.
101ST CONGRESS (Jan. 1989 - Dec. 1990)
First Session
S. 32: Federal Death Penalty Reestablishment Act.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 1/25/89 Introduced, 135 CONG. REC. S299.
10/17/89 The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 7-6
(Committee Vote No. 325) to add the Racial
Justice Act to the bill. Bill Tracking Report,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLT101
file.
RACE DISCRIMINATION IN DEATH SENTENCING
10/20/89 The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the
bill without recommendation, the vote for
recommendation having been 7-7 (Committee
Vote No. 326). Id.
S. 1696: Racial Justice Act.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 9/29/89 Introduced, 135 CONG. REC. S12,151.
Second Session
H.R. 4618: Racial Justice Act of 1990.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 4/25/90 Introduced, 136 CONG. REC. H1761.
S. 1970: Omnibus Crime Bill. Included Racial Justice Act.
Status: Not Enacted.
Chronology: 11/21/89 Introduced, 135 CONG. REC. S16,680.
5/24/90 The Senate voted 58-38 (Vote No. 108) to
strike the Racial Justice Act from the bill.
136 CONG. REc. S6910.
H.R. 5269: Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990.
Title XVIII (as introduced): Racial Justice Act.
Title XVIII (as passed): Fairness in Death Sentencing Act.
Status: Fairness in Death Sentencing Act was passed by the
House, but was then dropped in conference. Not
enacted.
Chronology: 7/13/90 Introduced, 136 CONG. REc. H4709.
10/5/90 The House voted 218-186 (Roll No. 422) to
substitute what would become known as the
Fairness in Death Sentencing Act for the
Racial Justice Act in Title XVIII. Id. at
H9005.
10/5/90 The House rejected, 216-204 (Roll No. 423),
a motion to strike Title XVIII from the bill.
Id. at H9011.
10/5/90 The House passed the bill, 368-55 (Roll No.
427). Id. at H9042.
10/22/90 The Senate insisted on its version of the bill
by voice vote. Id. at S16,479.
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10/27/90 Announcement that the conference committee
dropped Title XVI from the bill. 1d. at
H13,296.
100TH CONGRESS (Jan. 1987 - Dec. 1988)
Second Session
H.R. 4442: Racial Justice Act of 1988.
Status: Not enacted.
Chronology: 4/21/88 Introduced, 134 CONG. REc. H2472.
H.R. 5210: Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act.
Status: Enacted as Public Law 100-690.
Chronology: 8/11/88 Introduced, 134 CONG. REc. H7060.
10/13/88 The Senate rejected, 52-35 (Vote No. 369), a
motion to add the Racial Justice Act to the
bill. Id. at S15,755-56.
